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Beyond polemics: Poverty, taxes, and
noncompliance
Michelle Lyon Drumbl 1

Abstract
The earned income tax credit (EITC) is perhaps the most significant refundable credit in the U.S. tax system. Designed as an
anti-poverty program, it is a social benefit administered by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Studies show it has a positive
impact upon the children whose families receive it. Despite its many positives, however, the EITC is a program that for years
has been plagued by taxpayer noncompliance. Though it is believed that the majority of EITC noncompliance may be
unintentional, public reports of misconduct and fraud hurt the program’s image and fuel political rhetoric.
This article unpacks the rhetoric. It describes why the term ‘improper payments’ is not synonymous with fraud. It places
EITC noncompliance within the broader context of the US ‘tax gap,’ explores motivations for intentional EITC
noncompliance, and examines the role of inadvertent error in the overpayment rate.
Building upon theories of taxpayer noncompliance, the article concludes that increasing the amount of information required
from all taxpayers (whether self-prepared or using a preparer) at the time of filing will reduce both intentional and
unintentional EITC errors. Increasing these requirements, coupled with slowing down the refund process generally, is a
reasonable way to improve administration of the EITC program without unduly burdening low-income taxpayers.

Keywords: earned income tax credit, tax compliance, poverty law, tax policy
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INTRODUCTION
The earned income tax credit (EITC) suffers an image problem. Introduced in 1975,
today the EITC reaches more than 27 million households annually and is the most
significant earnings-based refundable credit in the Internal Revenue Code. 2 While the
EITC has long enjoyed bipartisan support and is lauded as a successful anti-poverty
program, it is also criticised for its complexity and its difficulty to administer and
enforce. 3 Despite the high audit selection rate for EITC returns 4 and a myriad of
approaches aimed at improving accuracy and educating taxpayers, the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS or ‘Service’) has been unsuccessful at reducing the rate of
EITC overclaims in the last decade. 5 Since 2003, the estimated rate of improper
payments on EITC claims has exceeded 20% and ranged as high as 30%.6 The annual
dollar amounts of improper EITC payments have ranged between an estimated
minimum of $8.6 billion (in 2004) to an estimated maximum of $18.4 billion (in
2010). These figures long have drawn the attention of the Treasury Inspector General
for Tax Administration (TIGTA) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO). 7
These overpayment figures add fuel to the political rhetoric about a tax system in
which nearly half of Americans pay no federal income tax. 8

2

Refundable Tax Credits, Cong Budget Off Rep No 43767, at 10 (Feb 2013). The Premium Tax Credit,
also refundable, is projected to surpass the earned income credit in size. In contrast to the earned
income credit, the Premium Tax Credit is an expenditure based, rather than earnings based, credit.
3
For an overview of the political history of the EITC, including examples of both bipartisan support and
criticisms, see Jason Furman, ‘Poverty and the Tax Code’ (2014) 32 Democracy 8.
4
EITC returns are twice as likely to be audited as the average individual income tax return. National
Taxpayer Advocate, 2011 Annual Report to Congress (2011) 300; US Government Accountability
Office, GAO-16-92T, Fiscal Outlook: Addressing Improper Payments and the Tax Gap Would
Improve the Government’s Fiscal Position 14–15 (Oct 1, 2015) (Statement of Gene L Dodaro also
noting that ‘about 45 percent of correspondence audits (audits done by mail) that closed in fiscal year
2013 focused on EITC issues.’)
5
See generally ‘Compliance Estimates for the Earned Income Tax Credit Claimed on 2006-2008 Returns’,
IRS Pub 5162 (Aug 2014). This report updates a similar compliance study released in 1999 that had
been considered to be ‘the authoritative source on the nature of EITC compliance’: at 1.
6
Treas Inspector Gen Tax Admin, ‘The Internal Revenue Service Fiscal Year 2013 Improper Payment
Reporting Continues to Not Comply With the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act’
2014-40-027 (Mar 31, 2014), figure 2, 5. Section 2, below, defines ‘improper payment’ and explains
why this measure is controversial.
7
See, eg, Treas Inspector Gen Tax Admin, ‘Existing Compliance Processes Will Not Reduce the Billions
of Dollars in Improper Earned Income Tax Credit and Additional Child Tax Credit Payments’ 2014-40093 (Sept 29, 2014); GAO-16-92T, ‘Fiscal Outlook: Addressing Improper Payments and the Tax Gap
Would Improve the Government’s Fiscal Position’ 15 (Oct 1, 2015).
8
According to Tax Policy Center estimates published in 2013, 50% of all households paid no federal
income tax in 2009. ‘Tax Units with Zero or Negative Income Tax Liability Under Current Law,
2004–2024’ Tax Policy Center, <http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/numbers/Content/PDF/T130228.pdf>, accessed 21 October 2016. This percentage was estimated to decline over time, but not by
more than a few percentage points; See ‘Table T15-0138: Tax Units with Zero or Negative Income Tax
Under Current Law, 2011–2025’ Tax Policy Center,
<http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/numbers/Content/PDF/T15-0138.pdf> accessed 21 October 2016.
For a detailed consideration of why EITC noncompliance attracts so much political attention, see
Lawrence Zelenak, ‘Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned Income Tax Credit’ (2005) 52
University of California Los Angeles Law Review 1867 (in which Zelenak attempts to answer his own
question: ‘Why does tolerance for errors that leave individuals with too much money and the
government with too little vary according to the tax, transfer, or hybrid nature of the program in which
the errors occur?’)
254
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Certainly, the rate of improper payments is troubling; the IRS must continue in its
efforts to reduce overpayments. It is important, however, to frame these figures within
a larger context of taxpayer noncompliance in the United States. As dollar amounts,
the EITC overclaim figures pale in comparison to the estimated annual $122 billion
underreporting tax gap attributable to business income on individual returns, 9 or to the
$40 to $70 billion dollars that are estimated to be lost annually to evasion through the
use of offshore tax havens and tax shelter abuses. 10 As a percentage of the gross tax
gap, improper EITC claims comprise perhaps only 3.5% of the total. 11
This article explores the nature and nuances of EITC noncompliance, identifies ways
in which it is both different than and similar to other types of taxpayer noncompliance,
critiques certain of the Service’s EITC enforcement efforts, and discusses ways in
which the IRS might improve upon its EITC audit selection and enforcement
mechanisms in the future. It concludes by proposing a program that would allow firsttime EITC claimants the option to submit substantiating documentation with the return
in order to receive an expedited refund.

2.

WHAT WE KNOW (AND DON’T) ABOUT THE EXTENT OF TAXPAYER NONCOMPLIANCE
This section provides a general overview of taxpayer noncompliance, the US tax gap,
and the nature of EITC noncompliance. It is believed that the majority of EITC errors
are inadvertent, and this is an important consideration to bear in mind when crafting
policy solutions. 12 That said, a significant portion of improper EITC claims are
9

The most recent tax gap figures show that, as of the 2006 data, 56% of business income that should have
been reported on individual tax returns went unreported. Robert Greenstein, John Wancheck and
Chuck Marr, ‘Reducing Overpayments in the Earned Income Tax Credit’ at 5 (Dec 1, 2015). The $122
billion in estimated underreported business income is ‘about ten times the estimated EITC
overpayments that year.’ See also IRS, Tax Gap for Tax Year 2006, IRS Pub 2012-4,
<http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/overview_tax_gap_2006.pdf> accessed 21 October 2016.
10
The 2006 Tax Gap study doesn’t pull this out separately in its data, and TIGTA has criticised the IRS
for that. See How Much Tax Cheating is Really Going On?, FORBES.COM (Sept 16, 2013 at 3:23 pm).
The TIGTA report mentions the $40 to $70 billion figure and cites to Jane G Gravelle, Cong Research
Serv, Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and Evasion (July 9 2009). See also Dave Rifkin, ‘An
Overview of the “Tax Gap”’ (2008) Scholarship @ Georgetown Law at
<http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/fwps_papers/77> accessed 21 October 2016. This article,
which used the 2001 data available at the time: ‘An estimated $50 to $100 billion (15 to 30 percent) of
the $345 billion tax gap is due to offshore tax haven and tax shelter abuses.’ The IRS’s most recent net
tax gap estimate (defined by the IRS as ‘the amount of true tax liability that is not paid on time’ less
‘account receipts from enforcement activities and late payments’), provided using 2006 data, is $385
billion. See ‘IRS Releases 2006 Tax Gap Estimates’, FS-2012-6, Jan 2012. Of the $385 billion, $28
billion is attributable to credits on individual income tax returns, while $122 billion is attributable to
underreporting of business income on individual income tax returns. IRS, Tax Gap ‘Map’ Tax Year
2006, see <http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/tax_gap_map_2006.pdf> accessed 21 October 2016.
11
Rifkin (above n 10) notes later ‘The IRS estimates that approximately $32 billion [ie, approximately
10%] of the tax gap is due to errors in claiming tax credits and deductions.’ This overstates the portion
attributable to the EITC in that includes all credits and deductions (again, this is 2001 data). My figure
of 3.5% is based on the most recent EITC improper payment estimates (using the ‘maximum’ figure of
15.6 billion) as compared to the most recent gross tax gap estimate of $450 billion.
12
Robert Greenstein, John Wancheck and Chuck Marr, ‘Reducing Overpayments in the Earned Income
Tax Credit’, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP), (Apr 7, 2014) (citing two older studies on
this point: Janet Holtzblatt & Janet McCubbin, ‘Issues Affecting Low-Income Filers’ in Henry Aaron
& Joel Slemrod (eds), The Crisis in Tax Administration (Brookings Institution Press, 2004); and Jeffrey
Liebman, Noncompliance and the EITC: Taxpayer Error or Taxpayer Fraud (Harvard University,
1995). See also Leslie Book, ‘The Poor and Tax Compliance: One Size Does Not Fit All’ (2003) 51
255
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intentional and/or fraudulent, just as taxpayers intentionally underreport or hide
income in other contexts. 13 Notably, it is important to understand and appreciate this
distinction, because the two ends of the spectrum present different enforcement
challenges and should be addressed by different policy prescriptions.
2.1

Estimating taxpayer noncompliance: The ‘tax gap’
The US revenue collection system is largely dependent on voluntary compliance. The
voluntary nature of the compliance is bolstered by such mechanisms as withholdings,
third-party reporting, and the deterrent effect of selective audit procedures. As a
means of evaluating the effectiveness of the system, the Service has developed
statistical methods to periodically estimate the ‘voluntary compliance rate’ (VCR) and
specific types of noncompliance. 14 These estimates, known as the ‘tax gap’, are
compiled and released every several years. There is a significant time-lag between the
statistics and the reporting. The most recent tax gap report was issued in 2012 (using
data from tax year 2006) as an update to the estimates released in 2006 (using data
from tax year 2001).
The Service provides estimated figures for the ‘gross tax gap’ and the ‘net tax gap.’
The former is defined as ‘the amount of true tax liability faced by taxpayers that is not
paid on time’, while the latter is the amount of tax liability that is not paid or
subsequently collected through Service enforcement. 15 The estimated VCR for tax
year 2006, calculated on the gross tax gap, was 83.1%; the IRS concluded this to be
‘statistically unchanged’ from the 2001 estimates. 16
In its 2006 estimate, the IRS reported a gross tax gap of $420 billion and a net tax gap
of $365 billion—representing a noncompliance rate of 14.5 percent. 17 Commentators

Kansas Law Review 1145, 1165. (‘Somewhat surprisingly, there is little data relating to how much
EITC noncompliance is intentional, although there is strong anecdotal evidence that a significant
amount of EITC noncompliance is caused by taxpayer ignorance or mistake.’) In his July 17, 2003
testimony to Congress, Leonard Burman framed EITC noncompliance within the context of all
taxpayer noncompliance: ‘while the noncompliance among EITC recipients is troubling, there is no
reason to think that it is any worse than exists among the taxpaying public generally, and is probably
lower than the noncompliance rate for certain classes of individuals and businesses.’ ‘Waste, Fraud,
and Abuse: Hearing Before the Comm On Ways and Means’ 108th Cong, 1 (2003) (statement of
Leonard Burman).
13
See generally Michelle L Drumbl, ‘Those Who Know, Those Who Don’t, and Those Who Know Better:
Balancing Complexity, Sophistication, and Accuracy on Tax Returns’ (2013) 11 Pittsburgh Tax Review
113.
14
See generally Internal Revenue Serv, Off of Research, Overview of the Tax Gap for Tax Year 2006 (Jan
6, 2012), <http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/overview_tax_gap_2006.pdf> accessed 9 September
2014) (hereinafter ‘IRS Overview 2006’); Treas Inspector Gen for Tax Admin, ‘The Internal Revenue
Service Needs to Improve the Comprehensiveness, Accuracy, Reliability, and Timeliness of the Tax
Gap Estimate’ 2013-IE-R008 (Aug 21, 2013) (hereinafter TIGTA, ‘Tax Gap’).
15
IRS Overview 2006, above n 14, at 1.
16
Ibid. Notably, an 83.1% compliance rate is high compared to many European nations. See, eg, JD
Tucille, ‘Globally Speaking, American Taxpayers Are Pushovers’, reason.com, Apr 17, 2012 12:33 pm
(reporting rates from a number of countries, including: the United Kingdom (77.97%); Switzerland
(77.70%); France (75.38%); Austria (74.80%); Netherlands (72.84%); Belgium (70.15%); Portugal
(68.09%); Germany (67.72%); and Italy (62.49%)).
17
Billy Hamilton, ‘How Big a Problem Is the Underground Economy?’ (2014) 73 State Tax Notes 847,
848). (‘no one knows precisely how large the underground economy is.’)
256
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note, however, that the IRS figure is ‘at best a sophisticated guess’, in part because no
one knows the extent of the underground economy. 18
The Service divides the tax gap into three categories: (1) the non-filing gap; (2) the
underreporting gap; and (3) the underpayment gap. 19 The underreporting gap is by far
the largest of these three categories, accounting for $376 billion of the tax gap, while
non-filing and underpayment account for $28 billion and $46 billion, respectively. 20
The individual income tax accounts for the largest segment of the gross tax gap (an
estimated $296 billion) as compared to corporate income taxes, employment taxes,
estate taxes, and excise taxes. 21 EITC noncompliance is categorised as underreporting
of individual income tax, specifically, an overstated offset of tax due. 22
Unsurprisingly, the Service finds that ‘compliance is far higher when reported
amounts are subject to information reporting and, more so, when subject to
withholding’. 23 Thus, noncompliance is more prevalent with regard to amounts
subject to little or no information reporting, such as sole proprietor income and rents.
For example, the Service estimates that $179 billion (comprising nearly 40% of the
gross tax gap) is lost due to misreporting of individual business income and related
self-employment taxes. 24
The Service estimates that the portion of the underreporting gap attributable to credits
is $28 billion, which is 6% of the overall gross tax gap. 25 This figure includes all
credits, not just EITC. Combining the tax gap estimates with other available data on
EITC overclaims, I estimate that EITC overclaims account for approximately 3.5% of
the gross tax gap. 26
As discussed in the next section, the Service is required to collect and report detailed
information annually on EITC overclaims as part of the federal government’s program
to reduce improper payments. A primary source of this EITC data is the IRS’s
National Research Program (NRP). 27 NRP estimates are based upon audit data,
including audits in which the taxpayer did not participate or in which the taxpayer
18

Ibid. Hamilton cites two academic studies, one estimating the underground economy may be as much
as $2 trillion annually, and the other estimating a $1 trillion shadow economy. The former study also
estimated the federal tax gap is higher than what the IRS estimates: somewhere between $450 and $500
billion, with noncompliance rates of 18 to 19 percent.
19
IRS Overview 2006, above n 14, at 1. The underpayment gap is based on actual amounts, while the
other categories are estimated amounts.
20
Ibid table 1.
21
Ibid.
22
TIGTA, ‘Tax Gap’ above n 14 at n 9. On the ‘Tax Gap Map’, EITC noncompliance presumably is
reflected in the subcategory of ‘credits’. See IRS, above n 10.
23
IRS Overview 2006, above n 13 at 1. The IRS reports that amounts subject to substantial information
reporting and withholding, such as wages reported on W2s, are accurately reported by taxpayers on
individual returns nearly 99% of the time; US Govt Accountability Office, GAO 12-651T, Tax Gap:
Sources of Noncompliance and Strategies to Reduce It (2012), 5.
24
US Govt Accountability Office, GAO 12-651T, Tax Gap: Sources of Noncompliance and Strategies to
Reduce It (2012). See also IRS, above n 10.
25
IRS, above n 10.
26
My figure of 3.5% is based on the most recent EITC improper payment estimates (using the ‘maximum’
figure of 15.6 billion) as compared to the most recent gross tax gap estimate of $450 billion.
27
Treas Inspector Gen for Tax Admin, ‘The Internal Revenue Service Is Not in Compliance With
Executive Order 13520 to Reduce Improper Payments’ 2013-40-084 (Aug 28, 2013), 8-9 (hereinafter
TIGTA, ‘Not in Compliance’.)
257
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prevailed after the initial audit had been closed. 28 These studies furthermore present
imperfect information insofar as they do not capture cases of undetected EITC
overclaims (those that were not detected by audit). Despite these shortcomings, the
NRP study nonetheless provides concrete data as to the types of errors that the IRS
discovers and identifies. While this is helpful in comprehending the types of
overclaims, unfortunately the reports do not shed light on whether these overclaims
are intentional or unintentional.
2.2

Improper payments and EITC noncompliance
The Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA) requires federal agencies to
annually review and identify those programs that are ‘susceptible to significant
improper payments.’ 29 The US Office of Management and Budget has declared the
EITC to be a ‘high-risk’ program. As a result of this designation, the Service is
required to undertake detailed studies to identify and reduce the level of erroneous
EITC payments and has been doing so since fiscal year 2003.
Two important caveats must be noted regarding the improper payment rate
calculations. First, ‘improper payment’ estimates are not intended to be estimates of
fraud. 30 The estimates encompass both intentional and unintentional overclaims.
However, this nuance is sometimes overlooked or misunderstood by critics who
conflate improper payments with fraud. 31 Second, improper payment rate estimates
28

‘[National Taxpayer Advocate] Nina Olson has reported that in over 40% of the cases where the IRS
examiners classified an EITC claim as invalid but the filer later received assistance from the Taxpayer
Advocate Service (a component of the IRS that the National Taxpayer Advocate oversees) in appealing
the ruling, the ruling was reversed.’ Greenstein, Wancheck, and Marr, above n 12 at 4. See also Book,
‘One Size Does Not Fit All’, above n 12, 1170, noting that taxpayer non-response to IRS examination
requests make it hard to determine the extent of overclaims and EITC noncompliance.
29
Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA), Pub L No 107-300, 116 Stat 2350. IPIA has been
amended and expanded by two subsequent acts of legislation and a recent executive order: Improper
Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA), Pub L No 111-204, 124 Stat 2224;
Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2012, Pub L No 112-248, 126 Stat 2390; and
Reducing Improper Payments and Eliminating Waste in Federal Programs, Executive Order 13520
(November 20, 2009).
30
US Govt Accountability Office, ‘Improper Payments: Recent Efforts to Address Improper Payments
and Remaining Challenges’, GAO-11-575T (2011), 5: ‘Fraud consists of intentional acts of deception
with knowledge that the action or representation could result in an inappropriate gain.’
<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11575t.pdf> accessed 21 October 2016.
31
As one example, US Senator Ron Johnson of Wisconsin was quoted as saying in a January 2014 speech:
‘Do you realize the average rate of fraud, whether it's in the Earned Income Tax Credit or Medicare or
Medicaid, across the board, food stamps — the average rate of fraud in those programs is 20 to 25
percent?’ When the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel asked for numbers to substantiate the claim, his policy
advisor clarified that the senator ‘meant error rates in the various programs, not actual fraud.’ Senator
Johnson then followed with a statement to the newspaper that ‘when he made his claim, he was
‘primarily referencing fraud’ in the Earned Income Tax Credit program.’ His statement continued: ‘I
made too broad a generalization to other mandatory spending programs based on reports in the press
and from colleagues that are not supported by other inspector general reports. I strive hard to convey
accurate information that is fully supportable, and I was mistaken in making this overly broad
generalization.’ Tom Kertscher, ‘PolitiFact: Testing Ron Johnson claim of 20% to 25% fraud in public
assistance programs’, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel Online, Jan 20, 2014 at 5 am,
<http://www.politifact.com/wisconsin/statements/2014/jan/20/ron-johnson/fraud-claims-20-25-centsevery-1-spent-four-govern/> accessed 21 October 2016. More recently, Rand Paul conflated ‘improper
payment’ with fraud and also overstated the dollar amounts: ‘When you look at the earned income tax
credit, it has about a 25 percent fraud rate. We're looking at $20 billion to $30 billion.’ Steve
Contorno, ‘Rand Paul says Earned Income Tax Credit has 25 percent fraud rate that costs up to $30
billion’, 30 January, 2015 at 1:27 pm, <http://www.politifact.com/truth-o258
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are intended to include not only overpayments, but also underpayments and payments
that were not adequately documented. 32 Thus in the EITC context, the improper
payment rate should include figures for taxpayers who are eligible for EITC but fail to
claim it, or claim less than they are entitled to claim. However, TIGTA has reported
that the IRS has not provided estimates of EITC underpayments 33 as required by
Executive Order 13520.
The EITC occupies a somewhat unique function in that it is housed in the Internal
Revenue Code but serves as a social program to provide anti-poverty payments to
low-income working individuals. Lawrence Zelenak has described the EITC as ‘a
welfare program that happens to be administered through the tax system,’ and has
contrasted the taxpayer’s self-declaration for eligibility for EITC through tax filing
with the process for applying for government benefits through other agencies, which
generally requires a claimant to establish eligibility to the agency prior to the receipt
of any benefits. 34 With that function in mind, the high improper payment rate must
also be viewed relative to the EITC program’s very low administrative costs, which
approximate 1% of the total program benefits. Contrast this to other social welfare
spending programs in the US that have far more direct contact with their recipients,
resulting in lower overpayment rates but far higher administrative costs: the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), for example, is cited as having a
typical overpayment rate of less than 5%, with an administrative cost that is more than
9% of the program’s benefits. 35
The Treasury Department has identified several factors that serve as barriers to
reducing EITC noncompliance, with no single of these ‘considered the primary driver
of program error.’ 36 These factors include: the complexity of the tax law; structure of
the EITC; confusion among eligible claimants; high turnover of eligible claimants;
unscrupulous tax return preparers; and fraud. 37 Note that these factors include barriers
to reducing both intentional and unintentional noncompliance. As to unintentional
noncompliance, in January 2014, IRS Commissioner John Koskinen addressed the
complexity of EITC provisions for taxpayers with children and went on to state: ‘Our
biggest problem isn’t that people are stealing the money who have no right to it at all.

meter/statements/2015/jan/30/rand-paul/rand-paul-says-earned-income-tax-credit-has-25-per/>
accessed 25 September 2015>.
32
GAO-11-575T, above n 30, 5.
33
TIGTA, ‘Not in Compliance’ above n 27, 3, 9. The IRS report responding to the TIGTA report
‘indicated that it intends to incorporate underpayments into its estimates beginning with the Fiscal Year
2013 estimate’: at 9.
34
Zelenak, above n 8, 1903.
35
See Congressional Budget Office, Refundable Tax Credits (2013),
<http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/RefundableTaxCredits_One-Col.pdf> at
21, stating that ‘federal and state governments together spend approximately $7 billion annually to
administer the program (which paid out approximately $75 billion in benefits in fiscal year 2011)’.
Hereinafter ‘CBO Report’, access 21 October 2016.
36
US Dept of Treasury, Fiscal Year 2013, Agency Financial Report, (Dec 16, 2013), 214. See
<https://www.treasury.gov/about/budget-performance/annual-performanceplan/Documents/2013%20Department%20of%20the%20Treasury%20AFR%20Report%20v2.pdf>
accessed 21 October 2016
37
Ibid.
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It is that the program is so complicated that people are inadvertently having difficulty
figuring out where they fit and where they don’t.’ 38
The most recent NRP study, published in August 2014, provides compliance estimates
for EITC claimed on returns in tax years 2006–2008 and found ‘no discernible change
in the overall tendency for noncompliance between 1999 and 2006–2008’. 39 It
reported that the majority of taxpayers (an estimated 79–85%) who overclaim the
EITC are in fact altogether ineligible for the credit, as opposed to overstating the
amount of money for which they are eligible. 40 Among ‘known errors’, the NRP
study identifies the most common error as income misreporting (appearing in 67% of
returns with known errors, and cited as the only error in 51% of identified overclaims),
particularly self-employment income misreporting. It is followed by qualifying child
errors (occurring in 30% of known overclaim returns, 15% of the time as the only
error), most commonly errors relating to the residency requirement. Lastly, the thirdmost common type of error is incorrect filing status. While qualifying child errors are
less common that income misreporting errors, the former constitutes a higher
percentage of overclaims by dollar amount.
While the dollar amounts of EITC overclaims are staggering in the aggregate, it is
important to keep perspective as to the individual noncompliance amounts. The NRP
study reports that ‘[a] large fraction’ (between 38% and 44%) of the taxpayers that
overclaim the EITC ‘do so by less than $500’. 41
The NRP study also provides noncompliance estimates according to who prepares
EITC returns. Significantly, the study finds ‘no statistical difference between selfprepared and paid-preparer returns in either the frequency of overclaims or the dollar
overclaim percentage.’ 42 Among those who do use a preparer, the study notes that
‘EITC claimants are more likely to use an unenrolled return preparer (43 percent) or a
preparer from a national tax return preparation firm (35 percent) than non-claimants
(28 percent and 14 percent, respectively).’ 43 Among those taxpayers who use a
preparer, the report highlights its estimate that returns prepared by IRS programs
including Volunteer Income Tax Assistance (VITA) and Tax Counseling for the
Elderly (TCE) have ‘much lower overclaim percentages’ than other types of preparers,
with unenrolled return preparers representing ‘the highest frequency and percentage of
EITC overclaims.’ 44 The report cautions, however, that it cannot account for the
reasons for these differences, and suggests this might reflect selection bias arising
from the taxpayer’s choice of preparer and does not imply that certain types of
preparers ‘are either less capable or more unscrupulous.’ 45
To be sure, EITC overclaims are a significant issue, even if the improper payments
caveats described herein suggest that the magnitude of the issue is overstated. The

38

William Hoffman, ‘Koskinen Kicks off Filing Season with Spotlight on EITC’ (2014) 142 Tax Notes
617.
39
‘Compliance Estimates for the Earned Income Tax Credit’, above n 5, iii.
40
Ibid iv.
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid 24.
43
Ibid.
44
Ibid.
45
Ibid.
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next section considers intentional taxpayer noncompliance generally and how
intentional EITC noncompliance may and may not be different.

3.

IS INTENTIONAL EITC NONCOMPLIANCE SIMILAR TO OTHER TYPES OF INTENTIONAL
TAXPAYER NONCOMPLIANCE?
This section compares two types of intentional noncompliance: EITC noncompliance
and sole proprietor noncompliance. It provides a brief overview of selected theories
of noncompliance. In doing so, the article hopes to highlight that EITC misconduct is
not fundamentally different than other types of tax misconduct.
Theories and models of tax compliance include: deterrence, tax morale, 46 norms
(including group identity and also attitudes toward government), 47 complexity of the
Code, the role of tax return preparers, 48 and opportunities. 49 Certain theories or
models are more applicable to studies of specific types or contexts of taxpayer
noncompliance. Thus, not all theories necessarily fit well to all types of
noncompliance.
Though not intended as a comprehensive review of the research on this subject, this
section examines some of what the IRS and academic researchers have studied and
written about the motivation behind intentional taxpayer noncompliance in the specific
context of sole proprietors. In doing so, it seeks to draw upon some connections
specific to intentional EITC noncompliance.
At first blush, it may seem odd to compare sole proprietors and EITC claimants — one
group earns cash and fails to report it accurately, while the other claims a social
benefit and fails to determine eligibility accurately. Intentionally noncompliant sole
proprietors deprive the fisc of revenue by underreporting, while intentionally
noncompliant EITC claimants contribute to the tax gap by overstating or claiming
credits to which the taxpayer knows he or she is not entitled.
This article posits that intentional EITC noncompliance in fact shares much in
common with intentional sole proprietor noncompliance. With both sets of taxpayers,
there is a lack of information reporting available to the government, which provides
opportunities to cheat and perhaps evade detection. With both sets of taxpayers, there
is evidence to suggest that community norms and/or a sense of systemic fairness or
unfairness may drive decisions about intentional noncompliance, and evidence to
suggest the limitations of deterrence-based IRS initiatives.
46

For a literature review of ‘tax morale,’ see Marjorie Kornhauser, ‘Normative and Cognitive Aspects of
Tax Compliance: Literature Review and Recommendations for the IRS Regarding Individual
Taxpayers’ 2007 Annual Report to Congress (2007) 138. Kornhauser emphasises that ‘tax morale
refers to taxpayer attitudes and beliefs—not behaviors’: at 142.
47
Susan Morse, Stewart Karlinsky and Joseph Bankman, ‘Cash Businesses and Tax Evasion’ (2009) 20
Stanford Law & Policy Review 37, 40–41.
48
Sagit Leviner, ‘The Role Tax Preparers Play in Taxpayer Compliance: An Empirical Investigation with
Policy Implications’ (2012) 60 Buffalo Law Review 1079; Book, ‘One Size Does Not Fit All’, above n
12, 1145.
49
Kent Smith and Karyl Kinsey, ‘Understanding Taxpayer Behavior: A Conceptual Framework with
Implications for Research’ (1987) 21 Law & Society Review 639, 642; Robert Kidder and Craig
McEwen, ‘Taxpaying Behavior in Social Context: A Tentative Typology of Tax Compliance and
Noncompliance’ in Jeffrey A Roth and John T Scholz (eds), Taxpayer Compliance: Social Science
Perspectives, Volume 2 (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989) 47.
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At least with respect to the concern of intentional noncompliance, studies of sole
proprietor noncompliance may provide useful insights and analogies as to intentional
EITC noncompliance.
3.1

Sole proprietor noncompliance
‘The problem [of the underground economy] is as old as the US tax system,
and probably as old as taxation generally.’ 50
The tax gap data discussed in section 2 above indicates a correlation between taxpayer
compliance and information reporting, finding high levels of noncompliance among
sole proprietors. 51 Having identified this as the largest portion of the tax gap, the
Taxpayer Advocate Service (TAS) conducted both a national survey and a community
survey of sole proprietors, and it linked the results of these surveys to IRS estimates of
the survey respondent’s actual tax compliance. 52 This national survey sought to
understand why those sole proprietors who pay their taxes voluntarily comply with the
law, because prior research led TAS to conclude that increasing voluntary compliance
is ‘the only practical way to reduce the tax gap’. 53 Accordingly, the national survey
was designed to investigate six specific factors identified in previous research as
‘potentially driving voluntary compliance’: 54
1) deterrence (the perceived likelihood of getting caught outweighs the
economic gain from cheating); 2) norms (taxpayers who believe most other
taxpayers comply are more likely to reciprocate by complying); 3) tax
morale (those who trust the government and feel the tax laws and procedure
are fair and fairly enforced may be more likely to feel a moral obligation to
comply, even if the outcome of those procedures is unfavourable); 4) trust
(taxpayers may use unfair rules or procedures, unreasonable penalties, bad
experiences with the IRS, or a lack of faith in government or the IRS to
justify either reducing efforts to comply or active noncompliance); 5)
complexity and convenience (taxpayers who face complicated rules may be
unable to comply, or may use complexity as a reason to justify
noncompliance); and 6) preparers and other third parties (tax preparers may
have a significant effect on tax compliance).
From the survey results, TAS concluded that the primary types of noncompliance
among sole proprietors are: 1) social noncompliance (taxpayers acting ‘in accordance
with social norms and peer behaviour’) and 2) symbolic noncompliance (taxpayers
‘perceived the law or the IRS as unfair’). 55 With respect to both types of
50

Hamilton, above n 17.
See text accompanying notes 23–24, above.
52
National Taxpayer Advocate, ‘Factors Influencing Voluntary Compliance by Small Businesses:
Preliminary Survey Results’, 2012 Annual Report to Congress (2012) (hereinafter ‘Factors Influencing
Compliance’). In its executive summary of the survey, TAS describes the survey as significant in that:
‘a large body of research discusses the potential effect of various factors on tax compliance, but this
study is the first to link survey responses to IRS estimates of the respondent’s actual tax
compliance…provid[ing] an unprecedented look at the differences between the views of the Schedule
C filers that are the most and least compliant, at least according to IRS estimates’: at 4.
53
National Taxpayer Advocate, ‘Researching the Causes of Noncompliance: An Overview of Upcoming
Studies’, 2010 Annual Report to Congress (2010) 75 (hereinafter ‘Researching the Causes’).
54
‘Factors Influencing Compliance,’ above n 52, 7–8, citing ‘Researching the Causes’, above n 53, 71–88.
55
Ibid 7, 38.
51
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noncompliance, the survey associated taxpayers with a distrust of government. 56
From these results, TAS recommended proposals that would promote trust in
government and the IRS, including tax simplification and taxpayer education that is
normative rather than technical.57 TAS also concluded that ‘[t]raditional enforcement
measures designed to deter could be ineffective, both because those likely to respond
may be predisposed to comply and because the survey results did not suggest that
asocial behaviour (ie, behaviour that may be addressed by increasing deterrence) is
prevalent.’ 58
In a similar vein, an earlier qualitative study of noncompliance among cash business
taxpayers in the US conducted by Susan Clearly Morse, Stewart Karlinsky and Joseph
Bankman noted the same connection between information reporting and compliance
(‘[b]y far the most important determinant of tax compliance is income source’) and
connected this relationship to opportunity as a causal factor:
The strong relationship between evasion and income source suggests that the
primary causal factor that explains evasion is opportunity. Employees
whose employers comply with wage reporting rules cannot cheat
successfully and so such employees do not cheat. Individual business
owners can cheat successfully … and, in the aggregate, individual business
owners do cheat. 59
Morse, Karlinsky and Bankman additionally cite peer influence, social norms, and tax
preparer influence—not complexity, morality, or opposition to government policy—as
the predominate drivers of cash business noncompliance. 60 Their qualitative study
concluded that ‘tax cheating follows opportunity, not complexity or immorality, and it
is shaped by peer influence’. 61 The authors note that ‘opportunity’ includes ‘the lowperceived likelihood of detection and penalty’ and further conclude that ‘[t]he
perceived equity of the tax system has less importance, and the complexity of the tax
law does not appear to play a significant role’. 62 The taxpayers they interviewed
reported that they learned tax evasion tactics from family and friends, and that tactics
are ‘shared wisdom among cash business owners’. 63 Interviewees noted a readiness to
advise other business owners, with one stating: ‘I tell people everything, like never,
ever deposit the cash.’ 64
Other interviewees involved in cash business rationalised intentional noncompliance
as a form of rough justice: ‘roughly equivalent to a sensible government subsidy for

56

Ibid 38.
Ibid 39.
58
Ibid. The previous research on noncompliance, published in 2010, was similarly sceptical about
traditional enforcement measures: ‘Deterrence may be least effective among taxpayers operating in the
cash economy — the largest component of the tax gap — precisely because the IRS cannot reliably
detect unreported income that is not subject to information reporting. Deterrence will also be
ineffective with respect to taxpayers whose noncompliance is unintentional.’ ‘Researching the Causes’,
above n 53, 76.
59
Morse, Karlinsky and Bankman, above n 47, 38.
60
Ibid 65.
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Ibid 67.
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Ibid.
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Ibid 65.
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Ibid.
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small businesses’ 65 or analogous to ‘direct subsidies to farmers or bail-outs to various
international businesses’. 66
The characterisations described in these two studies of sole proprietors bear important
similarities to observations about intentional EITC noncompliance. The next section
outlines selected studies and scholarship on EITC noncompliance, with an emphasis
on intentional noncompliance in particular.
3.2

Intentional EITC noncompliance
Intentional EITC noncompliance presents challenges similar to what the Service faces
with sole proprietor noncompliance: in both cases, the lack of information reporting
creates a knowledge asymmetry between IRS and taxpayer. Just as the IRS cannot
readily verify how much cash is received in a small business, it also cannot easily
verify the fact-intensive elements of EITC eligibility. 67
Among those taxpayers who knowingly claim refundable credits (including EITC) to
which they know they are not entitled, it is reasonable to believe the same general
factors drive noncompliance as those identified in the TAS research: 68 1) the
likelihood of getting caught; 2) norms; 3) tax morale; 4) trust; 5) complexity and
convenience; and 6) preparers and other third parties.
In his scholarship, Book has proposed a typology of low income and EITC
noncompliance 69 and identified specific structural incentives for certain types of
intentional EITC noncompliance. 70 Book’s work provides a useful tool from which
one can draw comparisons between sole proprietors and EITC claimants and also
frame policy prescriptions.
Among other categories in his typology, Book identified two categories of EITC
noncompliance that were also named by TAS as the primary types of noncompliance
among sole proprietors: 71 (1) social noncompliance and (2) symbolic noncompliance.
Of social noncompliance, Book writes: ‘if taxpayers believe that others are not
complying, then taxpayers will resent complying and be more inclined to cheat.’ 72
Conversely, ‘to the extent that taxpayers believe others are complying, then taxpayers
will not take advantage of the tax system.’ 73 Thus, it follows that the very fact that
65

Ibid.
Ibid 67.
67
Written Testimony of John Koskinen, Commissioner Internal Revenue Service, before the House Ways
and Means Committee Subcommittee on Oversight on the 2014 Filing Season and Improper Payments,
May 7, 2014 at 12 (noting ‘the significant degree of difficulty in enforcing compliance with the EITC,
which derives in large part from its eligibility requirements. EITC eligibility depends on items that the
IRS cannot readily verify through third-party information reporting, including marital status and the
relationship and residency of children.’)
68
‘Factors Influencing Compliance,’ above n 51, 7-8, citing ‘Researching the Causes’, above n 53, 71–88.
69
Book, ‘One Size Does Not Fit All,’ above n 12, 1167–1177. In this article, Book builds upon the work
of sociologists Robert Kidder and Craig McEwen by developing their typology of taxpayer
noncompliance into a ‘typology of EITC noncompliance’.
70
Leslie Book, ‘Freakonomics and the Tax Gap: An Applied Perspective’ (2007) 56 American University
Law Review 1163.
71
‘Factors Influencing Compliance,’ above n 52, 39.
72
Book, ‘One Size Does Not Fits All’, above n 12, 1176, citing Dan Kahan’s reciprocity theory.
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EITC overclaims have become a political issue will itself lead to future taxpayers
making intentional overclaims. As taxpayers read headlines highlighting EITC fraud,
it undermines their faith in the system and creates a feeling that they are losing out by
being an honest taxpayer.
A quick Google search will provide one insight into the culture of intentional EITC
noncompliance, as well as the public perception of this noncompliance. As but one
example, a website called Twitchy compiled a list of 22 tweets in January 2013 of
‘taxpayers looking to borrow children for tax credit’, commenting with a hint of
disdain: ‘Gotta love American ingenuity. Yeesh.’ 74 Upon closer examination,
however, not all of the tweets linked were examples of noncompliance. The tweets
did include several solicitations (‘Can I claim ur kid on my taxes ill give u 1500’;
‘Anybody have an extra kid I can claim on my taxes? I’ll split the cash’; and ‘Does
someone have a kid I can use on my taxes this year? Thanks ahead of time.’), but also
tweets more in the nature of wishful thinking (‘I need to find a single mom soon…so I
can claim her kid on my taxes asap’) or laments (‘I take her kid to school off and on.
The least she can do is let me claim her kid on my taxes’ and ‘the only reason why i
would want a kid right now is to get more money on my taxes lol’.) 75
The concept of claiming someone else’s child on one’s taxes stems from the
possibility that the parents who reside with and support the child, and thus would be
statutorily entitled to claim the child, will not benefit from doing so. The inability to
benefit from a credit that other people benefit from, coupled with the perception that it
is common for other people to wrongly benefit from claiming children that they are
not entitled to claim, can foster the climate of intentional noncompliance. Note that
this is very similar to the sole proprietor context, in which taxpayers who were
interviewed admitted that they cheated on their taxes and justified it by pointing out
that other people also cheat.
Book identified two common instances in which taxpayers fail to meet eligibility
requirements and are left feeling frustrated, leading them to engage in symbolic
noncompliance. He described these as ‘structural incentives within the EITC’ that
create the motivation to cheat. 76 His first example is the taxpayer who has more than
the maximum number of qualifying children. 77 Because the statute limits the benefit
to a maximum number of children, Book noted that taxpayers who have additional
children feel frustrated and are ‘tempted to ‘share’ the benefits with related parties
who may have earned income, but fewer than two qualifying children on their own.’ 78
His second example is the non-custodial parent who is connected to the children but
fails to meet the residency requirement. 79 While a non-custodial parent might be
eligible to claim his children as dependents and claim them for the child tax credit, he
cannot claim his children for the more valuable earned income credit, and he cannot
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<http://twitchy.com/2013/01/04/rent-a-kid-taxpayers-looking-to-borrow-children-for-tax-credit>
accessed 11 March, 2015). Some of the tweet links were still active, while others had been removed.
Tweets on file with the author.
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Ibid.
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Book, ‘Freakonomics’, above n 70, 1176–1177.
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For tax years beginning after 2008, the maximum number of qualifying children for EITC is three. IRC
§32(b)(1). From 1993 until 2007, the maximum number of qualifying children was two.
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Book, ‘Freakonomics’, above n 70, 1177.
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file using head of household status based upon his children. 80 This is true despite the
fact that the non-custodial parent may be required to pay child support for his children.
As Book noted, Taxpayer Advocate Nina Olson made a legislative recommendation
many years ago to allow the non-custodial parent a credit in this situation, 81 but
Congress has not followed her recommendation, so the structural incentive remains.
In my work directing a low-income taxpayer clinic, I have seen or heard of instances
of both of these types of symbolic noncompliance. But I am even more familiar with
a third scenario, in which the taxpayer who would be entitled to claim the children has
little or no earned income, but no one else is legally entitled to claim the children. In
some cases this is because the taxpayer receives social security disability payments,
which are not earned income as defined in section 32(c)(2). It may also be because
the taxpayer is a mother who is out of the workforce for a period of years because she
cares for her young children. In these cases, there may be a boyfriend in the
household who does have earned income and plays a significant role in supporting his
girlfriend’s children. If he is not the father of the children and the couple is not
married, he is not statutorily entitled to the claim the children for EITC. 82 As with
Book’s other examples, a couple in this situation may be frustrated by the perceived
inequity of the system and thereby motivated to engage in intentional symbolic
noncompliance. After all, if other people are using Twitter to find strangers’ children
to claim, why should a hard-working taxpayer not benefit from his girlfriend’s
children whom he actually lives with and supports?
3.3

Combating social and symbolic noncompliance
If we accept that EITC claimants and sole proprietors share similar motivations in
their intentional noncompliance, it follows, then, that proposals to reduce intentional
EITC noncompliance should be crafted in a similar fashion as the TAS
recommendations to address sole proprietor noncompliance. Recall that these
recommendations include ‘promoting trust in government and the IRS, including tax
simplification and taxpayer education that is normative rather than technical.’ 83 I am
sceptical of TAS’s recommendations, which I view as well-intended but unrealistic:
regardless of the type of taxpayer or the type of noncompliance, it is not easy to affect
cultural change regarding trust in government. As I discuss in section 6, the better
way to combat noncompliance is to increase information sharing between the taxpayer
and the government.
The next two sections of the article describe the different challenges that arise
depending on whether the taxpayer uses a return preparer or chooses to self-prepare.
The proposal in section 6 below attempts to bridge these two universes.

80

IRC §§152(e); 32(c)(3)(A); 2(b)(1)(A)(i).
National Taxpayer Advocate, ‘Tax Reform for Families: A Common Sense Approach’ 2005 Annual
Report to Congress (2005) 397, 398.
82
In this example, he may be entitled to claim the children as dependents. IRC §152(d)(2)(H). Unless he
is within the relationship described in §152(c)(2), he cannot claim the children for EITC or the child tax
credit, and he cannot file using the Head of Household status. See IRC §2(b)(3)(B)(i).
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RETURN PREPARERS AND EITC NONCOMPLIANCE
This section will discuss EITC noncompliance in the return preparer context,
including ways in which return preparers enable or instigate noncompliance. It will
evaluate some of the IRS initiatives in place to detect and deter noncompliance. This
is especially timely in light of the Service’s recent efforts to regulate the tax return
preparer industry. For years the Service has pointed to the return preparer industry as
one reason for the high rate of EITC noncompliance, and this was part of the rationale
for it developing the mandatory tax return preparer regulation scheme that was struck
down in February 2014 by the DC Court of Appeals.84 In the wake of that defeat, the
IRS introduced a voluntary program for uncredentialed return preparers for the next
filing season (known as the ‘Annual Filing Season Program’), again with the hope of
increasing competency and protecting taxpayers from unscrupulous preparers. The
program was criticised as an end run around the court’s decision, 85 but the IRS is
likely to continue its efforts at some form of regulation in light of its latest EITC
compliance study, which concludes that ‘unenrolled preparers …as a group have the
highest overclaim percentages among known preparer types.’ 86
A majority of EITC claimants rely on a paid preparer to file their income tax return.
The most recent NRP study, based upon tax years 2006–2008, found that
approximately 68% of EITC claimants used a paid preparer. 87 The study notes,
however, that the rate at which EITC claimants use paid preparers has declined
measurably in the years since. 88 In May 2014, IRS Commissioner John Koskinen
noted that approximately 57 percent of the returns claiming the EITC are prepared by
tax return preparers.’ 89
As noted in the previous section, IRS estimates show ‘no statistical difference in either
the frequency of [EITC] overclaims or the dollar overclaim percentage’ between paid
preparers and self-prepared returns. 90
However, within the data group of paid preparers, the IRS estimates show the error
rate — and the dollar overclaim percentage — to be significantly higher within the
subset of paid preparers who are not subject to regulation under Treasury Department
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See Loving v IRS, 2014 WL 519224 (CA DC), aff’g Loving v IRS, 917 F Supp 2d 67 (D DC 2013).
In July 2014, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) sued the IRS to block
the voluntary program, calling it ‘impermissible end run around Loving v. IRS’ Complaint at 2, Am
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Circular 230 regulations governing practice before the IRS and are not affiliated with
a nationally known tax preparation firm. 91
The IRS’s ill-fated attempt to regulate all return preparers was the culmination of
years of concern about this phenomenon based on studies and reports of problems
with the industry’s accuracy, lack of due diligence, lack of professionalism, and
unscrupulous behaviour. 92
The Taxpayer Advocate and others mention EITC returns as a particular concern due
to the size and refundable nature of the credit. 93 A number of limited sample
‘mystery-shopper’ compliance studies, both government and private, have revealed
disturbing levels of inaccuracy in EITC claims. Moreover, certain studies reveal
evidence of intentional overclaims by paid preparers. 94
The role of return preparers in EITC noncompliance has been examined for nearly two
decades, dating back to the findings of an IRS compliance study of tax year 1994. 95
Then as now, unscrupulous (and unregulated) return preparers have seized upon the
event of a taxpayer receiving a large refundable credit as an opportunity to sell various
products to the taxpayer. 96 This dynamic is inherently problematic, as it incents the
return preparer to inflate the refund so the taxpayer has more money to spend. 97
91

Ibid v, 24; the study cautions that ‘due to the problem of selection bias, one cannot conclude anything
about the relative ability or integrity of unenrolled preparers without further study.’ When stated as a
dollar overclaim percentage by preparer type, the higher end estimates very close as between this
subset of preparers and self-prepared returns.
92
See, eg, National Taxpayer Advocate, ‘Regulation of Return Preparers: Taxpayers and Tax
Administration Remain Vulnerable to Incompetent and Unscrupulous Return Preparers While the IRS
Is Enjoined From Continuing its Efforts to Effectively Regulate Unenrolled Preparers’, 2013 Annual
Report to Congress (2013) 67.
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See, eg, Nina Olson, ‘More Than A Mere Preparer: Loving and Return Preparation’ (2013) 139 Tax
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schemes of unregulated and unqualified so-called return preparers whose real interest in the tax return
process is to push high-interest loans (formerly refund anticipation loans, and now in the form of ‘paystub’ loans) and charge high fees’: at 769–770.
94
For a compilation and summary of several of these studies, see Chi Chi Wu, ‘How Errors and Fraud by
Paid Tax Preparers Put Consumers at Risk and What States Can Do’ (2013) National Consumer Law
Center Report; see also Brief for Amici Curiae, National Consumer Law Center and National
Community Tax Coalition in Support of Defendants-Appellants, Loving v Internal Revenue Service, No
13-5061 (DC Cir 2014). It is important to note that the inaccuracies described are far from limited to
EITC overclaims. Other inaccuracies involved: intentional omission of income; falsifying information
to make the taxpayer eligible for various deductions such as charitable deductions, job-related expenses,
and Schedule C business expenses; inability to properly deal with education-related credits and income;
misclassifying filing status; and data entry errors resulting in incorrect refunds. ‘Errors and Fraud’, 5–6.
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US Gen Accounting Office, Earned Income Credit: IRS’ Tax Year 1994 Compliance Study and Recent
Efforts to Reduce Noncompliance, GAO/GGD-98-150 (1998) (finding the EITC overclaim rate on
returns prepared by unregulated preparers was 31%, while the overclaim rate on returns prepared by
attorneys, CPAs, national tax preparation companies, and enrolled agents was 20%).
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For a detailed analysis of this phenomenon, see Danshera Cords, ‘Paid Tax Preparers, Used Car
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Return Preparers and Provide More Free Alternatives’ [2009] 59 Case Western Reserve Law Review
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As part of his work that builds on the Kidder and McEwen typology, Book categorises
this type of intentional noncompliance as ‘brokered noncompliance’, meaning the
overclaim occurred on the advice of a tax professional. 98 Book notes: ‘[t]here is a
wide range in the honesty of preparers, and there were reports of illicit preparers
generating business through their guaranteeing the windfall of government EITC
dollars.’ 99
Brokered noncompliance is of course not unique to EITC overclaims. It occurs in
many contexts, including the sole proprietor context discussed above in section 3.
Morse, Karlinsky and Bankman address this in their study and note that it includes a
continuum of behaviour on the part of the preparer: ‘Many preparers in [the cash
sector] adopt a “don’t ask, don’t tell” attitude toward their clients reported receipts. A
small minority of preparers, however, actively aid in their clients’ evasion’.100
Brokered EITC noncompliance should be viewed in that larger context, as it poses part
of a larger challenge the IRS faces. As revealed in the IRS’s most recent EITC
compliance study, there is significant overlap between EITC noncompliance and sole
proprietor noncompliance: recall that the study identifies the most common (and 51%
of time, the only) EITC overclaim error as income misreporting, in particular selfemployment income misreporting. 101 Income misreporting can result either at the
suggestion of the return preparer or at the taxpayer’s initiative coupled with a ‘don’t
ask, don’t tell’ attitude.
If approximately one-half of EITC overclaims are due to income misreporting, then
this is part of a broader noncompliance phenomenon, and one that has proven very
difficult for the IRS to enforce. Unfortunately, because it drives the improper
payment rate, it in turn fuels the EITC’s image problem.
The IRS has honed in on paid preparers as part of the problem and is working to turn
paid preparers instead into part of the solution. So far, it has been unsuccessful in its
attempts to regulate preparers. It remains to be seen whether Congress will provide
the IRS the authority to regulate preparers as there have been several bills introduced
that would do so. 102 Even if Congress does so, many (including this author) are
sceptical that regulation will provide a magic panacea that will correct the problems
with EITC noncompliance. 103
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The next sections provide an overview of some of the ways in which the IRS is
addressing the problem of noncompliant return preparers short of industry-wide
regulation.
4.1

Enforcing the due diligence requirement
One point of recent emphasis has been the requirement for paid preparers to exercise
due diligence in determining a taxpayer’s eligibility for the EITC.
This requirement was first enacted as part of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, 104 and
was in part intended to address concerns arising from the EITC compliance study of
tax year 1994. 105 As originally enacted, the penalty was $100 per failure. This was
increased to the current penalty of $500 in 2011. 106 The regulations promulgated
under section 6695(g) in 2000 required the return preparer to complete a due diligence
checklist (IRS Form 8867 or alternative), compute the credit using certain prescribed
methods, and maintain the form in their records for three years. 107 In 2011, the
Treasury Department amended the regulations to provide that Form 8867 must be
submitted with the return or to the taxpayer for filing with the return. 108
The Treasury Regulations provide the following example of EITC due diligence: 109
Taxpayer asks Preparer D to prepare her tax return and tells D that she has a
Schedule C business, that she has two qualifying children and that she wants
to claim the EIC. Taxpayer indicates that she earned $10,000 from her
Schedule C business, but that she has no expenses. This information appears
incomplete because it is very unlikely that someone who is self-employed
has no business expenses. D must make additional reasonable inquiries
regarding taxpayer's business to determine whether the information
regarding both income and expenses is correct.
Form 8867 is a four page form, in which the first three pages consist of a series of 24
yes or no questions for the return preparer to answer, though not all questions apply to
a given taxpayer. The questions are relatively straight-forward and can be used as the
basis for a client interview. On the fourth page is a checklist on which the preparer
must indicate the types of documents the taxpayer provided the preparer in connection
with the return. The documents pertain to residency of any qualifying children
claimed, disability of qualifying children (if applicable), and information used to
complete Schedule C (if applicable). Notably, the preparer is not required to rely on
any documents and can indicate such on the form.

104

Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub L No 105-34, §1085(a)(2), 111 Stat 788, 956.
Cords, above n 96, 374; HR REP 105-148, 105TH Cong, 1ST Sess 1997, 1997 WL 353016, 1997
USCCAN 678 (Leg Hist) at 695 (‘the bill provides three compliance measures to address the EIC
compliance problem’).
106
United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 2011, Pub L No 112-41, Title V,
§501(a), 125 Stat 428, 459.
107
TD 8905, 65 FR 61269, Oct 17, 2000. Additionally, the regulation imposed a knowledge and
constructive element as to eligibility: ‘The preparer may not ignore the implications of information
furnished to, or known by, the preparer, and must make reasonable inquiries if the information
furnished to, or known by, the preparer appears to be incorrect, inconsistent, or incomplete.’ Treas Reg
§1.6695-2(b)(3).
108
TD 9570, 76 FR 78819, Dec 20, 2011; effective for tax years beginning after December 31, 2011.
109
Treas Reg §1.6695-2(b)(3)(ii) Example 4.
105
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The IRS makes efforts to educate return preparers about the due diligence
requirements and Form 8867. Paid preparers who filed ten or more EITC returns
without Form 8867 in filing season 2013 received a warning letter, and the IRS issued
penalty letters to 225 of these preparers when they again filed ten or more EITC
claims without the required form in the 2014 filing season. 110 TIGTA reports that
these 225 tax return preparers prepared 5,729 tax returns claiming more than $18.7
million in EITC 111 — in other words, these preparers on average filed 25 EITC returns
claiming an average EITC of $3,264. The IRS proposed the section 6695(g) penalty
against these 225 preparers for each claim, meaning the proposed penalties total nearly
$2.9 million. 112 The preparers are given 30 calendar days to respond to the proposed
penalty and can request an appeals hearing. As of the release of the TIGTA report,
only $151,500 in penalties had been assessed against these 225 preparers. 113
The Treasury Inspector General reports that its analysis of EITC claims filed during
the 2012 through 2015 filing seasons shows that returns that include Form 8867 are
more accurate than those that do not: ‘as of May 7, 2105, the IRS identified processing
errors on 6.8 percent of EITC claims that were filed by a preparer without a Form
8867 compared to only 0.2 percent of EITC claims filed with a Form 8867’. 114
However, ‘processing error’ is defined as ‘eg, mathematical errors, invalid EITC
qualifying child Social Security Number (SSN), etc)’. This is not the same as
evidence of a reduction in intentional EITC overclaims. As TIGTA has pointed out
elsewhere: 115
the majority of potentially erroneous EITC claims the IRS identifies do not
contain the types of errors for which it has math error authority. For
example, the IRS identified approximately 6.5 million potentially erroneous
EITC claims totaling approximately $21.9 billion in Tax Year 2012 for
which it does not have math error authority. In Tax Year 2012, the IRS used
math error authority to identify and systemically correct only 241,975 (.009
or less than 1 percent) of approximately 27.3 million EITC claims. The
241,975 returns claimed EITCs totaling $299 million.
Still, it is evidence that the form increases accuracy to some degree.
One advantage of the EITC due diligence requirement is that it increases
communication between the taxpayer and the return preparer. An ethical return
preparer has every incentive to complete the form correctly and submit it. As to filling
it out correctly, the preparer will not wish to be associated with a significant number
of returns that examinations later reveal to be overclaims, because the IRS may turn its
attention to the preparer. As to submitting the form, the IRS can impose the penalty
110

Treas Inspector Gen Tax Admin, ‘Results of the 2015 Filing Season’ 2015-40-080 (Aug 31, 2015) 6
(hereinafter TIGTA, ‘Results’).
111
Ibid.
112
Ibid.
113
Ibid. TIGTA had criticised the IRS in prior years for not issuing section 6695 penalties. See Leslie
Book, ‘IRS Leaves Hundreds of Millions of Dollars in Preparer Penalties on the Table’ on Leslie Book,
Procedurally Taxing (January 7 2014), <http://www.procedurallytaxing.com/irs-leaves-hundreds-ofmillions-of-dollars-in-preparer-penalties-on-the-tabletitle-a/> accessed 21 October 2016.
114
TIGTA, ‘Results’, above n 110, 6.
115
Treas Inspector Gen Tax Admin, ‘Assessment of Internal Revenue Service Compliance with the
Improper Payment Reporting Requirements in Fiscal Year 2014’ 2015-40-044 (Apr 27, 2015) 9-10
(hereinafter TIGTA, ‘Assessment’).
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even if the underlying EITC claims are correct, so relying on different due diligence
practices while ignoring the regulation’s specific requirements will not protect even
the most honest preparer. 116
Applying due diligence standards to the qualifying child requirements makes good
sense. While qualifying child errors are the second most frequent error, this type of
error represents 38% of overclaim dollars. 117 The preparer’s use of Form 8867 alerts
the taxpayer to the requirements and the types of documentation that the IRS would
request if the return were audited. It moves the question from ‘how are you related to
the child?’ to ‘do you have documentation showing how you are related to the child?’
If the answer is no, the preparer can rely on the taxpayer’s word, but the taxpayer is on
notice that documentation may be required post-filing. In this regard, it surely reduces
the chance of unintentional noncompliance due to a miscommunication or an
incomplete interview process. At the same time, this due diligence requirement serves
a gatekeeper role in that it informs the IRS whether a preparer (who at least in some
cases is a professional subject to Circular 230) has seen documentation confirming
EITC eligibility. For the IRS, this is beneficial — it places the preparer in the role of a
de facto pre-refund auditor at no cost to the IRS. Presumably the IRS stratifies risk
according to the type of preparer and the type of documentation recorded on Form
8867: a return prepared by an attorney or CPA who certifies that they have relied upon
and retained school records verifying residence must surely be at less risk of audit than
an unenrolled preparer who certifies that they ‘did not rely on any documents’.
It is less clear how the EITC due diligence requirement will help reduce income
misreporting, which is the most commonly made error and appears on an estimated
two-thirds of EITC overclaim returns. 118 Further, if due diligence could cure income
misreporting, shouldn’t it be explicitly required as a separate questionnaire on all sole
proprietor returns? For instance, a preparer who relies on taxpayer records of gross
receipts and expenses on an EITC return is required by the regulations to retain copies
those records; however, on non-EITC returns, the preparer is not required to retain the
taxpayer’s records. Why not? In light of statistics and studies about cash business
noncompliance, why not apply the same standards to all sole proprietor returns? This
double standard highlights one way in which EITC noncompliance is stigmatised
relative to other forms of noncompliance.
Finally, the due diligence requirement will not necessarily cure intentional
noncompliance (or what Book calls ‘brokered noncompliance’ 119). An unscrupulous
return preparer who is determined to claim a bogus EITC can provide false
information of Form 8867, fail to file the form, or fail to sign the return (making the
return appear as if it were self-prepared, in which case the form is not required).

116

IRC §6695(g). See also Leslie Book, ‘The Intersection of Preparer Penalty and Taxpayer
Examinations’ on Leslie Book, Procedurally Taxing (June 26 2014),
<http://www.procedurallytaxing.com/the-intersection-of-preparer-penalty-and-taxpayer-examinations/>
accessed 21 October 2016.
117
‘Compliance Estimates for the Earned Income Tax Credit,’ above n 5, 17. (‘Where the only error is a
qualifying child error, the average estimated overclaim is $2,327.’)
118
Ibid. The report notes, however, ‘Overclaim dollars associated with income misreporting (only) are
disproportionately much lower, at 25 percent. The average overclaim associated with income
misreporting alone is estimated to be $673.’
119
Book, ‘One Size Does Not Fit All’, above n 12, 1173.
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Targeted return preparer education
Though resource intensive, the IRS believes that targeted preparer education is an
effective tool to combat EITC noncompliance. These include data-driven compliance
and warning notices, preparer audits by field examiners, and ‘knock-and-talk’ visits
from IRS Criminal Investigator agents. 120 The degree to which these efforts are
effective in reducing noncompliance must surely be hard to measure, but the
Commissioner reported that an expanded pilot program in 2013 ‘protected an
additional $590 million in revenue from being paid out improperly.’ 121 Of course,
$590 million is but a fraction of the estimated 17.7 billion in improper EITC payments
made in fiscal year 2014. 122

4.3

Pursuing injunctions and permanent bars against the most egregious preparers
As the US District Court for the District of Columbia emphasised in its Loving
opinion, ‘Congress has already enacted a relatively rigid penalty scheme to punish
misdeeds by tax-return preparers.’ 123 In addition to various monetary penalties, the
Code permits the government to bring civil action to enjoin tax return preparers from
engaging in certain conduct. The IRS and the Department of Justice Tax (DOJ)
Division work together under this statutory authority to pursue injunctions and
permanent bars against the most egregious offenders, including those who engage in
intentional EITC noncompliance. 124 These injunctions and bars are publicised with
press releases and website news items by both the IRS and the DOJ. 125
Certainly these actions are a resource and time intensive response to return preparer
noncompliance. However, the expressive value of these injunctions and bars (and in
some cases criminal prosecutions) may influence taxpayer perceptions of fairness,
which is important in a voluntary reporting system. 126

4.4

Query: Are these initiatives driving some taxpayers to do-it-yourself noncompliance?
Preparers certainly play a significant role in the EITC noncompliance problem. Laws
regulating the return preparer industry was the IRS’s favoured solution to address
incompetence and unscrupulous behaviour, but absent Congressional action
authorising such regulation, the IRS must focus its energy on other tactics.
There are reasons to suspect that noncompliance by return preparers is more
intentional than not, and that the behaviour trends more unscrupulous than
incompetent. The IRS should continue working with the DOJ to identify and pursue
those preparers as they have been doing. The IRS’s efforts to crack down on paid
preparer noncompliance are important and have both practical and symbolic value.
With that said, the added burdens on preparers, whether in the form of regulation or
increased due diligence, do come with a financial cost that is likely passed on to the
client. The IRS estimates that the average time needed to complete Form 8867 is 1
120

Koskinen testimony, above n 67, 13.
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TIGTA, ‘Assessment’, above n 115.
123
Loving v IRS, 917 F Supp 2d 67, 75 (D DC 2013).
124
See Drumbl, above n 103.
125
See, eg, <http://www.justice.gov/tax/program-shut-down-schemes-and-scams>.
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See discussion of social noncompliance in section 3, above.
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hour, 49 minutes. 127 As EITC returns inevitably become even more expensive for
low-income taxpayers, the increased cost may drive the number of self-prepared
returns higher. Taxpayers trying to ‘go it alone’ to save money run the risk of
unintentional errors due to complexity.
Other taxpayers may ill-advisedly rely on a friend or family member who is willing to
prepare the return on the cheap (or for free) but who plays fast and loose with the
eligibility requirements in order to ‘help’ the taxpayer. Such returns appear to the IRS
as self-prepared, and the amateur preparer is not subject to any risk of penalty — it is
the taxpayer who is left vulnerable if the IRS questions the return.
At least one CEO of a national tax return preparation firm, William Cobb of H&R
Block, thinks that another factor may drive taxpayers to ‘do-it-yourself’: 128
The implementation of inconsistent EITC eligibility standards and
documentation requirements has resulted in a movement of this issue out of
the assisted tax space and into the self-prepared channel (DIY), contributing
to a material change in EITC taxpayer behaviors. … The movement to DIY
and the billion dollar increases in the improper payment rate have gone
hand-in-hand.
In other words, there is concern that greater enforcement efforts directed at return
preparers will drive taxpayers who know they are EITC ineligible to do their own false
return on home software rather than face the stricter compliance standards imposed
upon them by a regulated tax return preparer. Cobb likens this to the analogy of
squeezing a balloon — if one part is squeezed, the air rushes to another. 129
With this concern in mind, and recalling that only 57% of EITC returns are prepared
by tax return preparers, 130 the next section considers noncompliance on self-prepared
returns.
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Instructions to IRS Form 8876, 3 (2014).
Letter from H&R Block CEO William Cobb to the Senate Finance Committee, and House Committee
on Ways and Means, Mar 10, 2015, on file with author and available at
<newsroom.hrblock.com/download/126469/hrb-ceo-to-sfc.pdf>.
129
Intuit chief tax officer David Williams used the balloon analogy first, but in the context of industry
combating tax return fraud on a company by company basis: ‘If any one company … decided to take a
whole bunch of actions that would 100 percent determine that every single one of their customers was
exactly who they said they were, that would not stop fraud in the industry. It would just push the fraud
around. It would squeeze the balloon.’ Jonnelle Marte and Craig Timberg, ‘Who’s to blame when
fraudsters use TurboTax to steal refunds?’ Washington Post, March 4, 2015. H&R Block CEO
William Cobb built upon this analogy in a letter asking Congress to extend the EITC due diligence
requirements to self-prepared returns. Of Williams’ balloon concern, Cobb wrote, ‘We could not agree
more! In fact, we have been saying exactly this with respect to the EITC. Here, a fraud and improper
payment filter (a series of questions) is being applied only to taxpayers who use paid preparers and the
same fraud and improper payment filter is NOT being applied to DIY taxpayers.’ Letter from William
C Cobb to Senators Orrin Hatch and Ron Wyden and Congressmen Paul Ryan and Sander Levin,
March 15, 2015, on file with author and available online at <https://presspage-productioncontent.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/1475/hrb-ceo-to-sfc.pdf> accessed 17 November, 2015).
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SELF-PREPARED RETURNS AND TAXPAYER ERROR
The IRS reports that in recent years the rate of EITC self-preparation has increased
while the rate of paid preparation has declined. 131 This section examines EITC
noncompliance issues unique to self-prepared returns. These range from lack of
taxpayer sophistication to lack of industry oversight, making it especially challenging
(yet increasingly important) for the Service to respond effectively and correctly to this
type of noncompliance. This section also describes the recent calls from industry and
members of Congress to impose greater burdens on taxpayers who self-prepare in
order to match the increased burdens that have been placed on return preparers. 132
It is unknown what percentage of self-prepared noncompliance is intentional as
opposed to unintentional. Due to the complexity of the EITC, there is reason to
believe that unintentional noncompliance is more common in this context than in the
return preparer context. 133 This section will explain statutory complexity as the root
cause of unintentional noncompliance and will also discuss how requiring more from
taxpayers who self-prepare might drive down the rate of unintentional noncompliance.
Requiring more from taxpayers who self-prepare might also drive down the rate of
intentional noncompliance, but for this to be effective, it must be coupled with more
meaningful sanctions for wrongdoing. Section 3 above discussed several theories of
intentional noncompliance that extend to self-prepared returns, such as social and
symbolic noncompliance. This section will consider how requiring more information
from taxpayers may affect these types of noncompliance, and how designing more
meaningful sanctions for ‘do-it-yourself’ fraud may help combat this type of
noncompliance.

5.1

Complexity: Why unintentional noncompliance may occur more often when taxpayers
self-prepare
The EITC requirements are complex, and this is surely a challenge for taxpayers who
self-prepare their returns. In her annual reports to Congress, Taxpayer Advocate Nina
Olson has repeatedly recommended simplifying the credits. 134 While I agree that
simplification would likely reduce taxpayer error, the statute is complex in part
because Congress intended to make the credit available to workers in non-traditional
family structures. It would be easier to administer a credit that is available only to
parents (including stepparents) who live with their children year-round. However, that
would be ignoring the demographic reality that children live in households headed by
grandparents, aunts or uncles, and sometimes even older siblings. Further, children
don’t necessarily live in the same household year-round. The Code sections
governing filing status, dependency exemptions, and family-based refundable credits
are complex because they attempt to capture certain of these demographic realities.
131

‘Compliance Estimates for the Earned Income Tax Credit’ above n 5, [24] n 51.
See below section 5.
133
If one accepts the estimate that the majority of all EITC noncompliance is unintentional, it is also
reasonable to believe that unintentional noncompliance is higher among self-prepared returns than
among those completed by paid preparers.
134
See National Taxpayer Advocate, ‘Legislative Recommendation: Simplify the National Status and
Related Requirements for Qualifying Children’, 2012 Annual Report to Congress (2012) 507–511;
National Taxpayer Advocate, ‘Research Study: Running Social Programs through the Tax System’,
2009 Annual Report to Congress (2009) 75, 90; National Taxpayer Advocate, ‘Legislative
Recommendation: Simplify the Family Status Provisions’, 2008 Annual Report to Congress (2008) 363.
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Congress should be applauded for the inclusiveness of these provisions, even if the
downside is complexity (and a corresponding higher error rate).
The complexity used to be even worse than it is now. Congress moved to a uniform
definition of qualifying child in 2004. 135 These changes were an improvement, but
still today the Code’s benefits for families do not perfectly align. For example, for a
taxpayer to claim a qualifying child as a dependent, the qualifying child must not have
provided more than half of their own support for the tax year. 136 A taxpayer claiming
a ‘qualifying child’ for EITC has no support requirement at all, while a taxpayer
claiming the head of household filing status must pay more than half the cost of
‘maintaining the household’ in a tax year. 137 If the child doesn’t meet the ‘qualifying
child’ test, the taxpayer might still be able to claim the individual as a dependent if
they meet the ‘qualifying relative’ test, but only if (among other requirements) the
taxpayer provided more than half of the person’s total support for the year. 138 While a
‘qualifying relative’ can be claimed as a dependent, this individual cannot be claimed
for EITC or child tax credit. 139 These subtle differences make it difficult for taxpayers
to keep track of how to file properly. It is possible for the same taxpayer to be entitled
to EITC but not head of household filing status; to be eligible for the EITC but not the
child tax credit; or to be eligible to claim an individual as a dependent but for no other
purpose.
Section 32, authorising the EITC, contains over 2,400 words. It contains crossreferences to more than 20 other sections or subsections of the Code, including
international tax provisions, passive loss rules, and capital gain definitions. 140 It
references half a dozen federal statutes outside of the Code.141 It is no wonder that
taxpayers — and even preparers — make unintentional errors in determining
eligibility.
The Service attempts to translate these statutory requirements to plain English, using
simplified forms, flowcharts and illustrations in its publications. 142 Some of these
resources are terrific, presuming the taxpayer can find them and/or has the patience
and sophistication to study them. But the most logical place to provide the
requirements is on Form 1040 itself — Form 1040 does capture the most essential
information. Taxpayers claiming a qualifying child are required to fill out Schedule
EIC to provide the child’s name, social security number, year of birth, relationship to
taxpayer, and number of months the child lived with the taxpayer during the tax year.
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Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, Pub L No 108-311, 118 Stat 1166, Sections 2001–2008; see
John Buckley, ‘Uniform Definition of a Child: Large Unintended Consequences’ (Mar 20, 2006) 110
Tax Notes 1345 for background on the uniform definition and a discussion of how the uniform
definition ‘lacks uniform application.’
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IRC §152(c)(1)(D).
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IRC §2(b)(1).
138
IRC §152(d)(1)(C).
139
IRC §§32 and 24, respectively, refer to ‘qualifying child’ and do not extend to ‘qualifying relative’.
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See §32(i).
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See §32(l) and (m).
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See, eg, IRS Publication 596 (2014). Though at 37 pages it may overwhelm a first-time claimant, the
publication provides flowcharts, examples and sample worksheets. The publication helpfully informs
taxpayers of the availability of free tax preparation services at Volunteer Income Tax Assistance (VITA)
sites, but this information is located on p 26 rather than in the introduction where it might be more
helpful to taxpayers.
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Schedule EIC is written clearly and captures the most relevant information concerning
the EITC requirements for a qualifying child on one page, but it doesn’t fully capture
the complexity, alert the taxpayer to certain pitfalls, or highlight the differences
between the EITC, head of household filing status and the child tax credit. The next
section of this article discusses why taxpayer intent matters, and how ascertaining
intent is key to developing appropriate and effective sanctions. Section 6 will suggest
an even more comprehensive approach to involving the taxpayer in information
gathering.
5.2

Intentional noncompliance on self-prepared returns: How increasing due diligence can
help the IRS ascertain taxpayer intent, and why that matters
Certainly some percentage of self-prepared return noncompliance is intentional. One
problem the IRS currently faces is that its examination and enforcement mechanisms
are reactive and not equipped to ascertain whether a taxpayer’s overclaim was
intentional or not. Increasing required due diligence, coupled with imposing more
meaningful sanctions for intentional noncompliance, could serve to better deter social
and symbolic noncompliance.
When the IRS detects a suspicious EITC return, a correspondence examination results.
Once money is paid, it is difficult to recover. Therefore, more often than not, the IRS
‘freezes’ the credit pending the outcome of the examination, meaning the taxpayer
does not receive the refund unless they prove to the satisfaction of the IRS (or, failing
that, the US Tax Court) that they were entitled to it.
In a significant percentage of cases, the taxpayer never responds to the correspondence
examination notices. One might infer one of two reasons for the silence: 1) the
taxpayer did not receive the notice, did not understand its significance, or did not
know how to meaningfully respond; or 2) the taxpayer knew they were not entitled to
the credit, and therefore consciously chose not to respond, recognising that they had
been ‘caught’.
In either case, the silence is problematic because the Service cannot ascertain whether
the noncompliance was intentional or unintentional. The former case denotes a
taxpayer who may be disenfranchised, unsophisticated, unable to access legal
representation, and/or may not even speak English. In some percentage of these
situations, it is possible that the taxpayer is entitled to the EITC but is incapable of
pursuing the matter further. This is the worst case scenario for the tax system, and the
Service should work to reduce the number of these cases by making examination
notices as simple as possible and informing taxpayers of the possibility of free legal
representation through Low-Income Taxpayer Clinics. Of course in a percentage of
these cases, the lack of sophistication or English literacy may have contributed to an
unintentional error, and so the ‘correct’ outcome is achieved. I do not advocate for
these taxpayers to be penalised for their error.
In the latter scenario, the taxpayer committed reckless or fraudulent behaviour and
was caught. But because the taxpayer ignored the examination notices, the IRS likely
does not have enough evidence to bring forth a civil fraud penalty case or other
punishment. Thus, the intentional wrong-doer taxpayer is not penalised any
differently than the unintentional or mistaken taxpayer. The lack of a meaningful
sanction may serve to fuel social and symbolic noncompliance.
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Accuracy related penalties apply to all overpayment claims
Taxpayers who erroneously claim the EITC are subject to the section 6662 20%
accuracy penalty, regardless of whether the error was unintentional and intentional. 143
In November 2013, in a decision that was viewed as quite favourable to low-income
taxpayers, the US Tax Court held that this accuracy related penalty could not apply to
the refundable portion of a credit (commonly referred to as the negative income tax):
that is, the amount refunded to the taxpayer in excess the amount of tax shown on the
return. 144 However, the Tax Court was legislatively overruled two years later when
Congress amended the definition of underpayment to explicitly include refundable
credits in the calculation of the accuracy related penalty. 145
I have argued elsewhere that the IRS is overly punitive in its application of section
6662 because it does not attempt to distinguish between intentional and unintentional
EITC noncompliance. 146 As a result, unsophisticated taxpayers face penalties of
$1,000 or higher even if their mistake was a wholly innocent one. To be clear, I do
not wish to see the Service penalise inadvertent error. But as I will explain in section
6 below, increasing information with return filing may put the IRS in a better position
to determine when the taxpayer is knowingly engaging in fraud.

5.2.2

Section 32(k) — taking away a right that one never rightfully had isn’t a meaningful deterrent
In cases where there is evidence of reckless or fraudulent noncompliance, the IRS can
impose (respectively) a two-year or ten-year EITC ban on the taxpayer.147 Schedule
EIC puts taxpayers on notice of this possibility: ‘If you take the EIC even though you
are not eligible, you may not be allowed to take the credit for up to 10 years.’ 148
This ban sounds meaningful, but is of questionable deterrent effect: the possibility of a
two-year or even a ten-year ban is likely meaningless for a taxpayer who is not
eligible for EITC to begin with. 149 In other words, a dishonest taxpayer can
intentionally claim an EITC to which they know they are not entitled, and not much is
at stake: if the IRS is suspicious, it will freeze the refund and issue a correspondence
examination notice. The taxpayer can simply ignore the notice, having given it a try
and failed. Meanwhile, if the refund was frozen, there is no financial penalty, no
interest to repay, and if the taxpayer was ineligible to begin with, the Code’s
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For many years, the accuracy related penalty applied to EITC overclaims even if the refund had been
frozen and never received by the taxpayer. See IRS Chief Couns Mem 200113028 (Mar 30, 2001). In
2012, Chief Counsel reconsidered this policy and issued guidance advising the Service not to impose
the penalty on frozen refunds. IRS Program Manager Tech Adv Mem 2012-16 (May 30, 2012).
Presumably this guidance stands following the legislative overruling of Rand.
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Rand v Commissioner, 141 TC 12 (November 18, 2013).
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See generally Drumbl, above n 13.
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IRC §32(k)(1).
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IRS Form 1040, Schedule EIC.
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Judge Morrison made this point in his dissent in Rand v Commissioner: ‘Many taxpayers who falsely
claim the earned income credit for one year will not qualify for the credit for the subsequent two years
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recertification requirement 150 and/or bans are meaningless. In other words, one loses
nothing for trying.
The Service must find ways to require more information from the taxpayer on the
return itself, and it must create better deterrents to noncompliance.
5.2.3

How increasing due diligence requirements can help drive down intentional noncompliance, if
coupled with more meaningful sanctions
As discussed in section 4 above, return preparers who commit fraud face civil and
criminal penalties, and the Justice Department and IRS publicise these cases as a
measure of general deterrence for the return preparer community. However, as the
preceding sections describe, there is no analogous deterrent for taxpayers who wish to
engage in ‘do-it-yourself’ EITC fraud.
This is a significant problem. If we believe that taxpayers who commit social
noncompliance do so because others are not complying, or because others are getting
away with it, 151 then there should exist a meaningful punishment for those who are
caught — in the absence of that, anyone who tries ‘gets away with it’: even if the IRS
doesn’t issue the refund, the taxpayer has lost nothing for trying.
While individual taxpayers are subject to criminal sanctions for wilfully making false
statements on tax returns, 152 it is rare for the IRS to bring criminal charges against a
taxpayer in the context of the EITC fraud on their individual return. 153 At a minimum,
the IRS should add a warning on Schedule EIC reminding a taxpayer that a false
statement on a tax return is a criminal offense. Preferably, Congress should enact a
provision providing specific criminal sanctions for EITC fraud. Individuals who
commit fraud in other social benefit programs are subject to criminal penalties. For
example, it is a felony offense for individuals to commit certain violations such as
trafficking (the knowing and improper use, transfer, acquisition, or alternation) of
benefits in the federal SNAP. 154 The punishment for SNAP trafficking is a maximum
fine of $250,000 or 20-year imprisonment. There is no reason to treat EITC fraud
differently, 155 or not to at least have that option on the books.
One difficulty in imposing criminal sanctions is the high burden of proof required of
the government. By way of example, the Internal Revenue Manual provides that
imposition of the ten-year EITC ban requires a final determination that the taxpayer
engaged in ‘affirmative acts of fraud’. 156 The manual includes the following as
examples of indicators of fraud: ‘Claiming dependency exemptions for nonexistent,
deceased, or self-supporting persons. Providing false or altered documents, such as
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IRC §32(k)(2).
See generally Book, ‘One Size Does Not Fit All’, above n 12.
152
IRC §7206.
153
For one notable and recent example of the government pursuing criminal charges against an individual
for filing false income tax returns claiming EITC, see <https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdmo/pr/ozarkman-pleads-guilty-false-tax-claim-advertised-craigslist-dependents> accessed 6 April, 2016.
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birth certificates, lease documents, school/medical records, for the purpose of claiming
… EITC, or other refundable credits.’ 157
An evidentiary problem arises: currently, a taxpayer is not required to provide with the
return any documents supporting an EITC claim. Thus, if audited, the taxpayer can
respond with silence, effectively preventing the IRS from pursuing a fraud case,
because it will never see the false documents.
This is why requiring more due diligence on self-prepared returns, or at least more
affirmative statements on the Schedule EIC, can combat intentional noncompliance.
If more due diligence were required, including affirmative statements about
relationship, the circumstances of residency, and the types of documentation that can
be provided upon request, the IRS would have some basis to pursue criminal charges
against taxpayers who knowingly make false statements. The IRS needs the power to
do so in the most egregious cases, just as it has the power to pursue a permanent
injunction against the most egregious tax return preparers.
Realistically, the IRS does not have the resources to pursue a significant number of
time-intensive cases with a high evidentiary requirement against individual taxpayers.
Again by way of analogy, the IRS imposes the ten-year ban infrequently: based on
data provided by the Taxpayer Advocate, it imposed it only 13 times, 27 times, and 17
times in 2009, 2010, and 2011 respectively. 158 But if it could hold itself out on the tax
forms as having the authority to pursue criminal charges (rather than just a ban that is
effectively meaningless) for EITC fraud, perhaps more taxpayers would think twice
before making a false statement.
The mere threat of criminal sanction would serve as a general deterrence, and perhaps
even create an expressive notion of integrity in the tax system among all taxpayers.
5.3

Combating unintentional error by increasing due diligence requirements: Easing the
statutory complexity without a legislative fix
William Cobb, CEO of H&R Block, wrote to the IRS Commissioner and Treasury
Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy and advocated for the IRS to modify Schedule EIC
‘to require all taxpayers — regardless of how they file — to answer the same
eligibility questions and to submit those responses to the IRS’. 159 According to his
letter, this proposal has been discussed since 2012 by an IRS-EITC Software
Developers Working Group. 160 Cobb characterises this proposal as ‘a simple,
common sense first-step to reduce improper payments among both self-preparers and
paid preparers.’ 161
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IRM 25.1.2.3(2) (06-09-2015), Indicators of Fraud
National Taxpayer Advocate, ‘Earned Income Tax Credit: The IRS Inappropriately Bans Many
Taxpayers from Claiming EITC’, 2013 Annual Report to Congress (2013) 104, n 12. It imposes the
two-year ban far more frequently: 5,438 times in 2011; but in a significant percentage of cases, it does
so inappropriately, because 39% of the time it does so without receiving any response from the
taxpayer. This practice is contrary to published IRS Chief Counsel guidance, which provides that ‘a
taxpayer’s failure to participate in an EITC audit does not justify imposing the ban’: at 103.
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Cobb letter, published in Tax Notes Today, Nov 11, 2014.
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Cobb believes that if this proposal were adopted, ‘the IRS would have better
information more quickly on the sources and causes of improper payments, and it will
likely see a reduction in the improper payment rate.’ 162
Cobb notes that the IRS can implement this change without statutory authority. 163
Cobb’s proposal makes far more sense than waiting for Congress to simplify the EITC
provisions (assuming one even thinks that simplification is desirable).
Book describes Cobb’s proposed changes as likely to be ‘good for the tax system’
because ‘changes that enhance visibility and accountability are the most effective and
cost-efficient ways of decreasing errors.’ 164 I agree with Cobb and Book, and describe
in section 6 how the IRS can go even further in partnering with taxpayers for
increased information.
Some members of Congress also agreed with Cobb’s proposal. A Senate
appropriations bill for fiscal year 2016 directed the Department of Treasury to ‘ensure
that the same eligibility questions are being asked of taxpayers whether they are
preparing their returns with a paid tax preparer or via do-it-yourself methods such as
paper forms, preparation software, or online preparation tools.’ 165 The Senate
Appropriations committee noted that this measure is intended to reduce the improper
payment rate on EITC: 166
Implementing uniform eligibility questions for refundable credit filers is a
common sense step that will help alleviate confusion over eligibility and
better establish qualification for these credits. The Department of the
Treasury shall ensure that all EITC eligibility questions included on Form
8867, such as questions 1 through 19 and the eligibility questions used to
meet the requirements of question 24, will be included on the Schedule EIC.
The Department of Treasury shall implement this for tax returns filed after
January 1, 2016.
David Williams, chief tax office of Intuit and formerly the Director of the Earned
Income Tax Credit office at the IRS, disagrees with this premise. Williams states that
‘making self-preparation harder will likely increase EITC error, not reduce it’ and
further states that increased information ‘is also a very bad idea because it puts the
burden of tax compliance squarely on lower-income working taxpayers.’ 167
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So how to strike an appropriate balance? If too much is required of return preparers,
taxpayers may prefer to self-prepare. If too much is required of self-preparing
taxpayers, it may discourage eligible recipients from applying.
While I am not in favour of burdening a vulnerable population, I will address in
section 6 why I believe requiring this information (and incenting additional
documentation) is not more burdensome than what is asked in other tax and non-tax
benefit contexts, and why it is ultimately the best solution for all EITC-eligible
recipients.

6.

KNOWLEDGE

IS POWER: A TWO-STEP (COMMON SENSE) PROPOSAL TO REDUCE
IMPROPER PAYMENTS AND COMBAT ALL FOUR TYPES OF EITC NONCOMPLIANCE

This section supports the calls for increased due diligence requirements on all returns,
whether completed by a paid preparer or self-prepared, and builds upon theories of
noncompliance to suggest that increased due diligence may help reduce both
intentional and unintentional EITC errors.
The quote ‘knowledge is power’ is commonly attributed to Francis Bacon. A more
modern variant is attributed to Ethel Watts Mumford: ‘Knowledge is power, if you
know it about the right person’. 168
Research on noncompliance and the tax gap confirms the common sense suspicion
that taxpayer compliance correlates with information reporting. In the case of the
EITC, this means having knowledge about not just income but also a taxpayer’s
personal situation. If the IRS had more knowledge before processing the return — if it
could readily and easily ascertain information about residency, relationships, and
income (ie, have better knowledge) on EITC claims — it could more effectively
reduce the improper payment rate.
Building on what (we think) we know about noncompliance, this section will outline
in two steps why requiring taxpayers to provide an increased amount of information
with the return, coupled with slowing down the refund process generally, is a
reasonable way to improve administration of the EITC program.
6.1

Step one: Increase information required on every return, with an additional statement
required of taxpayers claiming children they didn’t claim last year and an expedited
refund for those who can attach documentation to the return
Increasing due diligence requirements on all returns, including self-prepared returns, is
an appropriate start. All taxpayers — regardless of whether they self-prepare or rely
on a preparer, and regardless of whether they are claiming EITC for the first time or
the twentieth time, should have to provide basic information on an IRS schedule
indicating: the relationship; the number of months the qualifying child lived in their
home; and a box indicating the type of documentation they can provide to the IRS
upon request to substantiate their claim.
Currently, taxpayers are required to provide the first two items on Schedule EIC. The
third requirement is a proposed twist on Form 8867: whereas the form asks the
168
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preparer to indicate which documents, if any, the preparer was provided by the
taxpayer and relied upon in completing the return (and imposes a duty for the preparer
to retain copies of those documents), the form should ask the question of the taxpayer
and not just the preparer.
Why require this? Because it puts all taxpayers on notice that they may be required to
substantiate their claim. Currently, self-preparing taxpayers are not required to
consider such specifics about substantiation. Even taxpayers who rely on preparers
can have a return prepared simply by answering questions and without providing or
even describing the types of documents they have at home to substantiate the claim
upon request.
Schedule EIC or a revised due diligence form for all taxpayers should require an
affirmative statement from the taxpayer indicating that they can provide, upon request,
some type of evidence to verify the EITC claim. It is crucial that the form present
taxpayers with a wide array of options to indicate how they might substantiate the
claim. I know firsthand from representing low-income taxpayers that not all claimants
can provide the type of rigid documentation the IRS asks for upon examination, which
includes school records, medical records and utility bills spanning at least a six-month
period. 169 Not all children are school-aged, not all see the doctor regularly, and not all
taxpayers have bills in their name. Some taxpayers are transient, but move as a
family; some don’t keep paperwork when they move from residence to residence.
There are many legitimate obstacles that explain why low-income taxpayers may have
trouble providing official documentation showing at least six months of shared
residency with their qualifying children.
For this reason, it is imperative that taxpayers be allowed the option to indicate that
they can (upon request) provide an affidavit from any third party (including, but not
limited to, a spouse or relative) regarding the child’s residency. 170 A taxpayer
affirmatively indicating that they can provide a third-party affidavit upon request
should by no means be an automatic trigger for examination. EITC controversies that
go to trial in US Tax Court sometimes turn on the veracity of taxpayer testimony and
witnesses rather than the rigid documentation preferred by the IRS. 171
I propose that there should be a streamlined process for a taxpayer who claims the
same children in the following tax year. Parents claiming the same children year after
year should be provided an option to indicate on the form that their living situation is
the same as the last year.
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For examples of why some taxpayers cannot provide such documentation, see 2002 GAO report 15–20.
These descriptions are consistent with the various challenges I have seen in my representations.
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I have previously criticised both the automated nature of EITC correspondence examinations and the
rigidity with which documentation is accepted. See Drumbl, above n 13, at 132–139. A Taxpayer
Advocate Service study of 256 Tax Court cases in which the Service conceded that the taxpayer was
entitled to the EITC (though had been denied such at the audit level) discovered that in 20% of the
study’s cases an Appeals Officer or Chief Counsel attorney accepted documents that the Tax Examiner
had rejected. National Taxpayer Advocate, 2012 Annual Report to Congress (2012) 89–90. In 5% of
the cases studied, the Service conceded after concluding that the Tax Examiner misapplied the law.
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See, eg, Coats v Commissioner, TC Memo. 2003-78 (‘We find petitioner's testimony credible. We
find convincing petitioner's explanation for the discrepancy between the school records and his
testimony regarding where [his daughter] lived during 1998. Under these circumstances, we afford
more weight to his testimony than to the school records.’)
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Those taxpayers claiming qualifying child(ren) for the first time present a different
situation. The IRS should (and likely already does) primarily focus its enforcement
(and education/outreach) efforts on these first-time claimants. Up to one-third of
EITC claimants, each year, are ‘intermittent or first-time claimants,’ 172 and these
taxpayers may be less likely to understand or appreciate the EITC requirements. Thus
it is crucially important for the tax form itself to clearly communicate the requirements
and also put taxpayers on notice as to the gravity of self-declaring eligibility and the
potential post-filing consequences.
As part of increased due diligence, I propose that first-time claimants of qualifying
children should have to add a statement to Form EIC indicating what changed (ie, why
the children were not claimed last year). If this entry is left blank on the return, the
IRS should follow up with a simple letter to the taxpayer explaining that they must
provide a statement or the credit will not be processed.
Weighing the burden against the benefit, I do not think requiring a one or two sentence
explanation for first-time claimants will adversely impact the take-up rate of eligible
claimants. There are many easily-explained reasons a taxpayer may be claiming
children for the first time: children are born; people get married and gain stepchildren;
custody arrangements change; children move in with uncles or grandparents for a
variety of economic and/or relationship reasons; or the financial support structure
within a multi-generational household shifts.
Asking taxpayers to provide this information does not seem unreasonable given the
amount of the credit at stake. Having to affirmatively provide this explanation will
impress upon the taxpayer the significance of claiming entitlement for the first time.
Providing even a brief one-sentence explanation demonstrates good faith. In the event
the IRS decides to further scrutinise the return, the affirmative statement becomes the
starting point for the examiner.
An even more proactive way to strengthen due diligence would be to invite these firsttime claimants to optionally partner with the IRS in information sharing.
6.1.1

‘EITC Fast-Track’ — A voluntary path for taxpayers to partner with the IRS in exchange for
expedited refund consideration
This proposal is inspired by a government agency that plays an entirely different role
for the federal government: the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). 173
Think of the TSA line at the airport: every traveller who wishes to board the airplane
must go through the security line. But some travellers decide it is worth it to go
through the extra rigor of qualifying for the optional ‘TSA Precheck’ program: they
fill out extra forms, provide documentation of citizenship or immigration status,
provide fingerprints, and voluntarily subject themselves to a behind-the-scenes
screening process. In exchange (assuming they are cleared), they receive a known
172

TIGTA, ‘Not in Compliance,’ above n 27, 2.
The taxpaying public may not be so enthused about a proposal that borrows an idea from the TSA;
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Eileen Sullivan, ‘Poll: Travelers Dislike TSA as Much as IRS’, Associated Press, USAToday.com,
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traveller number and the privilege of expedited clearance every time they travel
thereafter. The program is purely optional: not every traveller does this, though all
travellers who clear security eventually arrive at the same destination. Some,
however, clear more quickly because they have voluntarily provided a government
agency with additional information. They have partnered with the government by
sharing knowledge about themselves.
I envision a similar program that would serve as an EITC Fast-Track for first-time
claimants. Imagine an example: Joe Taxpayer is claiming EITC for the first time this
tax year because he married Jane Taxpayer and now has three stepchildren who are
qualifying dependents. Assume that Jane does not have a filing obligation because her
only income was from social security disability; thus, no taxpayer claimed the children
last year. Presumably as a married couple they will now file a joint income tax return.
Like all taxpayers, they will be required to provide the standard information indicating
relationship, number of months the children resided in the household, and the type of
documentation they can provide upon request to substantiate the claim. Like all firsttime EITC claimants, Joe and Jane will have to make an affirmative one or two
sentence statement explaining this straightforward change in circumstance if they wish
to receive the EITC.
Beyond that, they have two options: 1) they can enclose substantiating documentation,
which might include the marriage certificate and a letter from a relative or neighbour
attesting that all five individuals lived together for at least six months of the year; 2)
alternatively, they can choose not to submit any documentation. If they choose option
one, the IRS will process the refund on a ‘fast-track’ basis. If they choose option two,
they will still receive the refund, but it may take several weeks longer to process
because the IRS would have to verify eligibility through its regular internal procedures
(and as I propose in the next section, the IRS should slow down all refunds subject to
these verification procedures). Depending on how those internal procedures turn out,
Joe Taxpayer may be asked to provide the marriage certificate at a later time. Just as
all compliant passengers eventually get on the airplane, all eligible taxpayers would
get their EITC — but some would get it faster than others.
Consider these proposals for increased due diligence in the context of symbolic
noncompliance. As discussed in section 3 above, one common type of noncompliance
is when a boyfriend claims his girlfriend’s children (and he is not the father). Under
the current procedures, this may be likely to trigger an examination because the IRS
will know he has never claimed the children before. If his return is audited and the
refund frozen, he simply can ignore the notice and he is not penalised in any way for
trying. There is also a chance that his claim would slip through undetected and that he
would receive the improper payment without examination.
But imagine if this proposal were implemented and that the boyfriend (a first-time
claimant of these children) was required to include a statement explaining the change
in circumstance on Schedule EIC. Would he be so bold to write that he married the
mother and these are now his stepchildren; particularly if Schedule EIC included a
warning that a false statement is a criminal offense?
On the other hand, if the taxpayer indeed had married the mother last year, and he is
making first-time claim to which he is entitled, he would simply include an affirmative
statement to that effect, and he could even choose to submit documentation under the
‘EITC Fast-Track’ option.
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This approach would incent a population of first-time claimants to affirmatively show
they are entitled to the benefit. Of course not all taxpayers have the resources, means,
or sophistication to provide the appropriate affirmative documentation with the return
for a ‘fast track’ EITC refund. Again: this should not create a barrier to the EITC; in
these cases the IRS should allow self-declared eligibility as it always has, but the
refund will not be processed on an expedited basis.
Long-time observers of the EITC might find this proposal reminiscent of a
controversial pilot program that the IRS once proposed and abandoned — EITC precertification. I rebut that comparison and distinguish my proposal in the section that
follows.
6.1.2

Pre-certification: Why it failed, and how this proposal is different
To some, the ‘fast-track’ proposal may be reminiscent of a previous IRS pilot program
that required pre-certification for a test sample of taxpayers for tax years 2003 and
2004. 174 The pre-certification pilot program proved to be quite controversial, and the
Service ultimately abandoned the pilot program after two tax years. While policy
makers and scholars noted that the program the program might improve compliance,
common concerns included that it ‘also could significantly reduce participation, and
might not save the government much money.’ 175 Some criticised it as unfairly
targeting poor taxpayers, 176 and for requiring something of EITC claimants that is not
required of other taxpayers: 177
There are also real issues in subjecting EITC recipients to a pre-certification
process that does not apply to any other tax filers. People do not need to precertify before taking a charitable deduction for a used car or clothing, even
though there is ample evidence that these deductions are overstated. Sole
proprietorships do not need to pre-certify that they are not hiding cash from
the tax authority before claiming deductions for inventories, rent, and
equipment, even though they are notoriously noncompliant. And so on.
The optional nature of the fast track EITC proposal draws in part on lessons learned
from the IRS’s ill-fated pre-certification pilot program. That program selected a small
population (45,000 taxpayers) and imposed an additional burden on them — one that
was not imposed upon other EITC claimants or any other type of taxpayer. The
mandatory nature of the pre-certification was, in my view, its greatest shortcoming. It
burdened taxpayers who lacked the sophistication, means, language skills, or time to
comply with its requirements.
I share the concerns about limiting participation and burdening a vulnerable
population. For this reason, the fast-track program should be strictly optional, and
taxpayers who do not opt in should be disadvantaged only as to timing of the refund.
For those who do not opt in, the agency will have to take a more active role in
verifying the claim. Hence, the longer processing time (which in the next section I
174

See IRS Announcement 2003-40, 2003-26 IRB 1132, 2003-1 CB 1132, 2003 WL 21362731.
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suggest is appropriate for most taxpayers in any event). Taxpayers who do not opt in
would not face a presumption of noncompliance; as with the current system, they
would make a claim of eligibility and the IRS would use its filters to assess the risk of
paying the credit without requesting documentation of eligibility through examination.
Some segment of the EITC population, however, is able to comply with additional
information reporting, and may be willing to do so if it means receiving the refund on
an expedited basis. The IRS should allow this population to self-select for a number
of reasons. First, it is highly unlikely that a taxpayer who voluntarily submits
documentation would engage in deliberate noncompliance. Morse, Karlinsky and
Bankman conclude that intentional noncompliance is driven by opportunity and ‘a
low-perceived likelihood of detection and penalty’. 178 The fast-track procedure would
invite increased scrutiny, which is the opposite of what an intentionally dishonest
taxpayer would want to attract. In a similar vein, Book writes of symbolic
noncompliance: ‘to the extent that taxpayers believe others are complying, then
taxpayers will not take advantage of the tax system’. 179 If a significant percentage of
taxpayers were to elect to offer more documentation than is required in order to
receive their EITC more quickly, it will demonstrate that this population is complying
beyond the minimum requirement. Presumably, those who know that they do not
meet eligibility requirements would not affirmatively draw attention to themselves by
attempting a fast-track refund. In these regards, a fast-track option could advance the
sort of cultural change and trust in government that underpinned the Taxpayer
Advocate Service recommendations to address sole proprietor noncompliance.
Fast-track taxpayers would effectively remove themselves from the pool of claimants
who would otherwise be scrutinised for eligibility with third-party information
reporting. This in turn would allow the IRS to direct its limited resources to a
relatively smaller population of claimants.
Would a ‘fast-track’ option unfairly target poor taxpayers? By definition, any form of
increased due diligence requirement directed at EITC taxpayers is directed at lower
income taxpayers. It is true that we do not subject sole proprietors, taxpayers claiming
itemised deductions, or taxpayers claiming education credits to tougher due diligence
requirements at the time of filing. Arguably, we should. But in any event, the EITC is
somewhat special — as Zelenak notes, it is a hybrid provision that is housed in the tax
system but functions as a social benefit. 180 And even with increased due diligence
standards and an optional ‘fast-track’ program, claiming the EITC is far less
burdensome that applying for more traditional welfare benefits such as SNAP or
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). 181
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Even within the tax code, there are examples of increased reporting or due diligence
requirements in other taxpayer realms, including ones that typically involve moderateor high-income taxpayers. Consider the burdensome reporting regime imposed upon
US citizens holding foreign accounts. At certain income thresholds, these taxpayers
are subject to two separate and potentially overlapping reporting regimes: foreign
bank and financial account reporting (FBAR) and the Foreign Account Tax
Compliance Act (FATCA). Taxpayers who run afoul of these reporting requirements,
even non-wilfully, can face significant civil penalties, and criminal penalties may also
apply. The penalty structure is far more serious than anything faced by EITC
claimants. While there are many legitimate reasons to hold an offshore account, all
taxpayers are swept up in the reporting regime because the government has made this
type of tax evasion an enforcement priority.
As discussed, the two biggest causes for EITC overclaims are income misreporting
and the residency requirement. Of the two causes, income misreporting is the trickier
one for which to require substantiation. Not all taxpayer income is reported on a Form
W2 or 1099. But to the extent that income is subject to third-party reporting, the IRS
would benefit by either 1) speeding up the matching process, or 2) slowing down the
refund process. The next section describes why slowing down can reduce improper
payments.
6.2

Step two: Slowing it down–the agency verifies the claim, maximizing information
available to it
I am hardly the first person to suggest that the IRS should not issue a refund until it
has had time to verify the claim. The IRS struggles with a difficult balance: the EITC
is meant to lift people out of poverty, and delaying refunds hurts people who rely on
the credit to pay bills. Yet rushing a refund creates different problems, including not
just improper payments to people claiming the credit incorrectly, but also identity theft
that diverts the refund from the taxpayer who is entitled to receive it. 182
Much of the information the IRS would like to have to verify EITC claims is
available, but not always at the time of filing. While the ideal solution is for the IRS
to modernise its technology so it could speed up verification, for the time being the
more realistic solution is to slow down the refund to check it against the systems it
has.

Randy Alison Aussenberg and David H Carpenter, ‘Drug Testing and Crime-Related Restrictions in
TANF, SNAP, and Housing Assistance’, CRS Report R42394, 18 November 2015. Compared to such
invasive monitoring and punitive administration, increased due diligence and a ‘fast-track’ proposal for
EITC seem like fairly mild measures.
182
Book notes that ‘dummying up tax returns with phony withholding amounts that take advantage of the
IRS’s lack of early access to information returns is the main tool of the identity theft fraudster.’ Leslie
Book, ‘Warren Buffet Calls for Expanding EITC: Tax Administration Impact Highlights There is No
Free Lunch’ on Leslie Book, Procedurally Taxing (May 27 2015)
<http://www.procedurallytaxing.com/warren-buffet-calls-for-expanding-eitc-tax-administrationimpact-highlights-there-is-no-free-lunch/> accessed 21 October 2016. The Senate Finance Committee
introduced a Bill to address this concern; the Bill would require employers to submit Forms W2 and
1099-MISC to the IRS by mid-February in most cases. Joint Committee on Taxation, ‘Description of
the Chairman’s Mark of a Bill to Prevent Identity Theft and Tax Refund Fraud’ (JCX-108-15),
September 11, 2015.
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As to income reporting, the IRS depends on third-party verification to verify accuracy.
Under the current approach, the EITC refund is typically issued before the IRS has
received and processed all third-party information including Forms W2 and 1099.
Thus, if the taxpayer has made a mistake in calculating income, or has underreported
income (whether inadvertently or intentionally), the IRS is left playing catch-up after
the return has been processed. To the extent that the IRS cannot independently verify
income, we must accept any accompanying EITC overclaim as an inevitable form of
taxpayer noncompliance, just as we accept that cash business noncompliance is
relatively high.
Moreover, information reporting as to residency is not as simple. The IRS needs to
modernise; it needs to invest in upgrading its technology and database sharing,
particularly with other social benefit programs administered by states. Along these
lines, the Urban Institute undertook a recent case study using data from Florida ‘to
explore whether SNAP data could be used to improve EITC enforcement and whether
SNAP data can provide information that would help the IRS identify EITC-eligible
workers who have not claimed the tax credit.’ 183 There is far from perfect overlap
between SNAP recipients and EITC eligible claimants: SNAP includes an asset test,
whereas EITC does not. Approximately one-half of SNAP recipients have children,
and approximately one-half of those who have children have earned income. 184 Of the
Florida data set showing overlap between SNAP recipients and EITC claimants, the
SNAP data verified the EITC relationship test in 99% of cases. 185 However, the
available SNAP data was ‘insufficient’ to verify the EITC residency test in 20% of the
cases. 186 The study concluded that ‘the information that applicants report to SNAP is
not detailed enough to conclusively verify eligibility, but the data could help the IRS
spot potential overclaims worthy of further examination as part of the audit process.’
Slowing down EITC refunds would aid the Service in maximizing these verification
opportunities.

7.

CONCLUSIONS
The EITC is overly complex, is not administered effectively, and has a high improper
payment rate. The EITC process will never be perfect. It can’t be: it is impossible to
design a benefits program with a 100% take up rate and a 0% noncompliance rate.
The politicians and taxpaying population must accept that reality, especially as one of
the ‘costs’ of administering a benefits program on the cheap.
Competing pressures are at play. If enforcement is too low, noncompliance may
increase. But enforcement costs money, and one of the most attractive features of the
EITC is its low administrative overhead relative to program size.
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Increasing due diligence requirements on all types of filers would increase the burden
on low-income taxpayers. But the additional layers of due diligence recommended in
this article would protect taxpayers, both from themselves and from their preparers.
Given the amount of money at stake, it is not unreasonable to increase the burden,
especially on those who are claiming qualifying children for the first time.
The IRS must continue to develop initiatives to improve the administration of the
EITC; doing so may be key to the continued political viability of what is a very
important anti-poverty program. Those who benefit from this program deserve this
protection. Time and again, the program has been shown to improve the lives of
children. The US cannot afford to lose those benefits because of the political fallout
from inept administration of this program.
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